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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."1 The Utah 
Legislature has provided that the Utah Supreme Court may transfer "to the Court of 
Appeals any case over which the Utah Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,"2 
which jurisdiction includes review of any order, judgment, decree over which the Court of 
Appeals "does not have original jurisdiction."3 As the Court of Appeals does not have 
original jurisdiction over this appeal filed by Citizen Mast,4 and the Utah Supreme Court 
declined to take jurisdiction of the case, the Court of Appeals has proper jurisdiction of this 
appeal. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court prematurely and actually err when it determined that the oral 
and written statements by Commissioner Overson about Citizen Mast and 
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, a Utah corporation, ("C.T.U.") were not defamatory 
as a matter of law? 
The standard of appellate review applied to summary judgment decisions views 
"the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party," according no 
1
 Utah Const., Article VIII, §5. 
2
 U.C.A. § 78-2-3(4) 
3
 U.C.A. § 78-2-30) 
4
 U.C.A. § 78-2a-3 
1 
deference to the "conclusions of law" made by the trial court.5 "Whether a statement is 
capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning is a question of law" which is reviewed for 
"correctness."6 
The standard that is used to review a trial court's granting or denial of a Rule 56(f) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("U.R.C.P.") motion is one of an abuse of discretion.7 
The record below reflects Citizen Mast's legal claim that Commissioner Overson 
made defamatory statements regarding him when Commissioner Overson held a press 
conference on August 22, 1996. The defamatory claim raised by this appeal was 
specifically raised in the Complaint,8 addressed by Commissioner Overson's motion for 
summary judgment,9 and detailed in the oral argument by both counsel at the hearing on 
summary judgment.10 
5
 Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Company, 922 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996) (citations 
omitted.) 
6
 West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1006 (Utah 1994). 
7
 Strand v. Associated Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191,193-194 
(Utah 1977). 
8
 In the complaint, Citizen Mast alleged that "Defendant [Overson] accused 
Plaintiff [Mast] of being a "liar" and of personally attacking Defendant and Salt Lake 
County through an alleged "ruse" involving an organization known as the Concerned 
Taxpayers of Utah." (Complaint, fl 5; Record at page 2 (hereafter "Rp ")) 
9
 The legal existence of the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah is specifically 
identified in the Uncontroverted Facts of Commissioner Overson, # 6, pg. vi. (Rp 220) 
as well as the Affidavits submitted by Citizen Mast in support his Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. 
motion (Affidavit of Mast; Rp 264-271 and Affidavit of Simon; Rp 272-275). 
10Transcript of Hearing 27-28 (Rp 457-458); 31-32 (Rp 461-462), 40-41 (Rp 470-
471), 42-43 (Rp 472-473), 44 (Rp 474), 61 (Rp 491), 71-72 (Rp 501-502), 76-78 (Rp 
506-508). 
2 
APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL 
Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. states that "[s]hould it appear from affidavits of a party opposing 
the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify 
his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may make a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to 
be had or may such other order as is just." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Citizen Mast filed litigation against Commissioner Overson because Commissioner 
Overson had made defamatory oral and written statements regarding Citizen Mast at a 
press conference held in a public conference room at the County Building in Salt Lake 
City. Commissioner Overson admitted that he announced to a public press conference 
that "this 'Concerned Taxpayer of Utah' is a ruse. It is strictly a front for David Masf11 and 
had for those present a written statement that David Mast was using "the deceptive name 
of Concerned Taxpayers of Utah"12 or "whatever [he] called [him]self.w13 
Without filing an answer, and after Commissioner Overson received extensions of 
time from Citizen Mast to do so, an extensive motion for summary judgment was filed in 
lieu of an answer. During this time period, Citizen Mast had sought unsuccessfully at least 
twice to take the deposition of Commissioner Overson. After oral argument, and taking 
11
 Incontroverted Facts of Commissioner Overson # 42, pg. xvi and footnote 1 
(Rp 230); A 0230 and A 0231 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 196-197). 
12
 A 0230 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 196). 
13
 A 0231 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 197). 
3 
under advisement the Rule 56(f) U.R.CP. motion of Citizen Mast for leave to first take the 
deposition of Commissioner Overson, the trial court granted summary judgment against 
Citizen Mast on the grounds that the statements made in the newspapers were not 
defamatory as a matter of law. Because of this ruling, the various privileged defenses 
raised by Commissioner Overson or the Rule 56(f) U.R.CP. motion of Citizen Mast were 
not considered by the trial court. 
Because the trial court failed to (1) take into account all of the evidence before it 
regarding the defamatory statements of Commissioner Overson, Citizen Mast and C.T.U. 
and (2) grant the Rule 56(f) U.R.CP. motion of Citizen Mast, the trial court prematurely 
granted Commissioner Oversows motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the 
statements made were not defamatory as a matter of law. Furthermore, even if the 
Court's action was not premature, the Court erroneously granted the motion because the 
statements that were made regarding Citizen Mast and his relationship to C.T.U. were, in 
fact, defamatory as a matter of law and the record before the trial court showed that the 
claimed privileges were not applicable. 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Properly Review or Allow Discovery of All Relevant 
Evidence Prior to Ruling on Commissioner Overson's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
The trial court's memorandum decision specifically identified the evidence that it 
relied upon for evidence of defamatory statements. 
The defendant's [Overson's] reactions to the 
advertisement [of C.T.U.] were reported and quoted in two 
separate local newspaper articles. Closely following these 
articles, a full-page advertisement, paid for the defendant's re-
election committee and co-signed by the defendant and 
4 
others, was published in a local newspaper. The statements 
alleged to be defamatory to the plaintiff [Mast] are contained 
within these three publications.14 
The trial court failed to acknowledge in its analysis that it also had before it the written 
statements of Commissioner Overson at the press conference which stated that David 
Mast was using "the deceptive name of Concerned Taxpayers of Utah"15 or "whatever [he] 
called [himjself."16 The phrase "deceptive" has been recognized in Utah judicial opinions 
as a state of mind that would indicate an individual did not have honesty, integrity or 
trustworthiness.17 
In addition, the trial court failed to allow discovery to be made when a request under 
Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. was specifically made to take the deposition of Commissioner Overson 
to clarify and elucidate what was stated at the press conference. Citizen Mast sought to 
take the deposition specifically because 
[t]he full text of his statement is not now in my possession, and 
can only be obtained by discovery. The version attached to 
Defendant's Motion is not, in my recollection, accurate and 
14
 Memorandum Decision, Page 2 (Rp 407). 
15
 A 0230 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 196). 
16
 A 0231 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 197). 
17
 Indicating one would come back with a warrant when one knew they would not 
be able to come back with a warrant was "deceptive." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 
1207 (Utah 1995). "The state obviously has a substantial and compelling interest in 
protecting the public from false, deceptive, or misleading advertising." In re Utah State 
Bar Petition, 647 P.2d 991, 993 (Utah 1982). "It is further significant that there is 
nothing secretive or deceptive about this conveyance." Road Runner Inn v. Merrill, 605 
P.2d 776, 777 (Utah 1980). "The offense of theft by deception is plainly intended to 
protect unwary members of the public from a broad range of fraudulent or deceptive 
schemes." State v. LeFevre, 825 P.2d 681, (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted.) 
5 
complete. Without discovery I will not be able to refute the 
version used by the Defendant. . . . I have not been able to 
obtain, and will not be able to obtain without discovery, copies 
of the way in which this news conference was reported on 
radio and television.18 
The failure to allow discovery requested pursuant to Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. had two 
significant impacts: 
First, the trial court failed to have before it an entire oral text of the press conference 
where Citizen Mast claimed the defamatory statements were made by Commissioner 
Overson. This can be shown in two ways: First, the trial court limited itself to a review of 
what one Deseret News reporter stated regarding the case.19 Second, even if the entire 
text was not available from Commissioner Overson or his public relations firm, alternate 
versions of the conference on radio and television could have sought to elucidate the 
nature of any additional comments and statements made by Commissioner Overson. A 
factual question as to the nature and extent of those comments was created by Citizen 
Mast when he stated under oath that a[t]he version attached to the Defendants motion is 
not, in my recollection, accurate and complete."20 
18
 Affidavit of David K. Mast, Iffl 4, 7 (Rp 265). 
19
 Judicial notice may well be taken of the common experience that newspaper 
accounts — while better than no account — either usually do not contain all statements 
made in their entirety or only include those that are relevant to the issue or perspective 
of the reporter. For example, the Salt Lake Tribune account of the same press 
conference appeared to have drawn more from the written statement and failed to 
address the accusations made by Commissioner Overson that Citizen Mast had used 
C.T.U. in a deceptive way, as a ruse or front for his own benefit. Compare Affidavit of 
Ellis A 0229 (Rp 198) and A 0330 (Rp 197). 
20
 Affidavit of David K. Mast, ffll 4 (Rp 265). 
6 
Second, there were significant factual questions that were present regarding the 
nature of the defenses available to Defendant Overson. Questions of fact regarding the 
nature of the capacity in which he was acting — official or private —, his awareness of the 
difference between C.T.U. and Citizen Mast, and his motivation for making his declarations 
regarding Citizen Mast were all recognized to exist by the trial court at the time of oral 
argument. For example, as to the questions of fact relating to the capacity in which 
Commissioner Overson was acting, Judge Thorne engaged in the following discussion with 
counsel for Commissioner Overson: 
THE COURT: I mean, if there was such an immunity, 
the Supreme Court wouldn't have issued the decision they did 
a couple of weeks ago. 
MR. GURMANKIN: I'm not sure — 
THE COURT: Paula Jones and the President.21 
Specifically focusing on the facts of this case, Judge Thorne engaged in the following 
discussion with counsel for Commissioner Overson: 
THE COURT: So, Mr. Overson could get up at a press 
conference and talk about somebody's personal life, make 
things up and he has an absolute defense? 
MR. GURMANKIN: If he went beyond his duties in 
dealing with South-South Mountain, then perhaps not; but as 
long as he was talking in the confines of what he had done 
and what — 
THE COURT: Well, let's say it's within the confines of 
South Mountain, he could get up and say, Mr. Mast is a so-
and-so and does these things to kids and this to this and he 
would have absolute immunity? 
MR. GURMANKIN: The answer to that is, as long as it's 
in the course of performing his executive duties, yes. 
And that's similar to the speech and debate clause of 
the — of the Constitution. 
21
 Transcript at 45, lines 4-9 (Rp 475). 
7 
THE COURT: But the — doesn't the fact question come 
up when he crosses the line that line to — in terms of personal 
versus official duties?22 
Even when legal and factual arguments were crossed the trial court struggled with the 
unresolved factual question of whether Commissioner Overson was acting in his personal 
or official capacity at the press conference: 
THE COURT: Well, I guess I still have a question even 
looking at all those, was he defending himself as an individual 
or was he defending the policies that he had supported as an 
official, or a little bit of both at that conference? 
MR. GURMANKIN: Well, I would say that he — if he 
was doing both, it's still subject to that absolute immunity 
because keeping the public's confidence in the integrity of a 
public official as an individual is just as important. 
THE COURT: Maybe I just grew up at the wrong time. 
That sounds an awful lot like Watergate to me. I mean, where 
you — you say the defense of the individual is really the 
defense of the institution.23 
Not only did Commissioner Overson's public and private conduct appear to create a 
conflict of fact in the trial court, but the Commissioner's personal knowledge of the 
separate nature of Citizen Mast and C.T.U. and the motivation of the Commissioner to 
directly and indirectly imply false information regarding them was also identified by Judge 
Thome as an area that would, at a minimum, require additional discovery. 
THE COURT: But — but I would suggest that what Mr. 
Snuffer indicated was that your client knew that Mast and 
C.T.U. were not synonymous and his discovery would provide 
Transcript at 47, line 18-48, line 13 (Rp 477 -478). 
Transcript at 49, line 12-50 line 11 (Rp 479-480). 
evidence of that and so that then becomes a factual 
question.24 
* * * * 
THE COURT: Yes, but I can see, Mr. Gurmankin, that 
there are a number of things that you're putting forth that 
would support your client's view that they were the same; but 
whether they are or whether they are not, or whether your 
client believed it or not becomes a factual question, doesn't it? 
MR. GURMANKIN: No-no, your Honor, if — if he had 
a good faith belief. A good faith belief-basis for believing it-
assuming it was defamatory and l-l can't believe that's— 
THE COURT: But they haven't — they haven't asked 
him that question yet, and aren't they entitled to say, Did you 
have a good faith belief? Did you know about these other 
things? Isn't that what the purpose of the deposition is, is to 
see what those facts are?25 
Thus, had the trial court, during oral argument, saw it was necessary to rule on the 
defenses of privilege raised by Commissioner Overson, but it could not have done so 
because of what it already recognized were the conflicting questions of fact that existed 
in the record as to two dispositive issues that could vitiate all of the defenses. Those 
issues were — in what capacity was Commissioner Overson acting and was Commissioner 
Overson, based on the unrefuted evidence of his prior knowledge of the distinct difference 
between C.T.U. and David K. Mast, malicious when he made defamatory reference to 
Citizen Mast at the press conference. 
The trial court's failure to consider evidence of defamatory language that was before 
it and not allow discovery to proceed to secure the entire statement of Commissioner 
Overson and its context, including the motivation for its declaration, constitutes reversible 
24
 Transcript at 54, line 24 - 55 line 3 (Rp 484-485). 
25
 Transcript at 55, line 22 - 56, line 12 (Rp 485-486). 
error as a matter of law in two ways. First, the written statement of Commissioner 
Overson at the press conference indicated that David Mast was using "the deceptive 
name of Concerned Taxpayers of Utah"26 or "whatever [he] called [him]self."27 However, 
since C.T.U. receives funds as a separate entity from Citizen Mast and has spoken out on 
many political matters such as the Utah Transit Authority budget, the Utah bid for the 2002 
Olympics and the proposed light rail system26 and other matters, even if Citizen Mast was 
opposed to the same,29 to claim that Citizen Mast used C.T.U. as a "deceptive name" for 
himself, personally, constitutes under Utah law at least an implicit statement that Citizen 
Mast has engaged in criminal conduct.30 This is defamatory language in and of itself and 
with or without the language quoted from the Deseret News constitutes a basis for 
reversal. 
Second, the trial court should have allowed discovery to occur so that the most 
complete account of what happened at the press conference and what motivated 
26
 A 0230 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 196). 
27
 A 0231 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 197). Of course, the Affidavits of Scott Simons, 
Robert Christiansen, and Randall Doyle and the Uncontroverted Facts of 
Commissioner Overson noted heretofore all refute the claim that Citizen Mast and 
C.T.U. are as a matter of law the same entity. 
26
 Affidavit of Scott Simons fl 5 (Rp 273). 
29
 Affidavit of Randall Doyle fl 6 (Rp 384). 
30
 If C.T.U. was used by Citizen Mast as a deception, it could easily be 
contended that as President he had unlawfully dealt with the property of the corporation 
as a fiduciary, U.C.A. § 76-6-513, or that if the corporation was deemed not to exist 
under "alter-ego" theories, the funds received by C.T.U. (now alias Citizen Mast) had 
been obtained by deception in violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-405(1). 
10 
Commissioner Overson could be presented to the court. At the oral argument, Citizen 
Mast suggested to the trial court that the precedent raised in the case of Strand v. 
Associated Students of University of Utah™ precluded summary judgment and required 
discovery to proceed. Like that case, the nature of the defamatory language and the 
applicability of the defenses raised in the summary judgment materials of Commissioner 
Overson 
concerned knowledge in the possession and control of 
defendant; there had not been sufficient time since the 
inception of the law suit for plaintiff to utilize discovery 
procedures, and thereby have an opportunity to cross-examine 
the moving party. The pleadings had not been closed, and 
there were complex legal issues posed, with an inadequate 
factual basis. Under such circumstances, it was an abuse of 
discretion to grant defendant's motion. The court should have 
ordered a continuance to permit discovery, or denied the 
motion for summary judgment, without prejudice after its 
renewal, after adequate time had elapsed in which the plaintiff 
could have obtained the desired information.32 
Whether the obvious questions of fact that existed in Commissioner Oversows own motion 
or those raised in Citizen Mast's Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. are used, the facts that went to the 
heart of the defenses of privilege raised by Commissioner Overson were not yet available. 
Thus, under Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. precedent, the motion should have been postponed until 
at least the full text of the oral statements made at the press conference and the motivation 
for attacking Citizen Mast and C.T.U. were obtained. 
31
 Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191,194 (Utah 
1977). See Transcript page 15, line 18 - page 16, line 3 (Rp 445- 446). 
32
 Id 
11 
There was an error in the failure to consider evidence before the trial court of what 
was communicated in writing at the press conference. There was an error in refusing to 
allow discovery to occur so that a more complete account of what was said at the press 
conference would be available for review. As a consequence of these errors, the trial court 
prematurely and erroneously concluded that the statements made by Commissioner 
Overson regarding the relationship of Citizen Mast and C.T.U. were not defamatory as 
matter of law. 
B. Even if the Trial Court Properly Limited Evidence of the Statements Made by 
Commissioner Overson, Factual Questions Should Have Not Allowed Entry of 
Summary Judgment. 
Even without the written comments made by Commissioner Overson at the press 
conference that were before the trial court, or those additional statements that would likely 
be obtained through proper, orderly discovery, the statements that were in the record 
regarding the relationship between Citizen Mast and C.T.U. created sufficient factual 
questions about the statements being defamatory and applicable privileges so as to 
prevent entry of summary judgment against Citizen Mast. 
Commissioner Overson admitted for purposes of the summary judgment motion that 
the statements reported in the Deseret News were accurate. He stated that "this 
'Concerned Taxpayer of Utah* is a ruse. It is strictly a front for David Mast." w This 
statement was made even though at the time C.T.U. was in fact a corporation in good 
33
 Uncontroverted Facts of Commissioner Overson # 42, pg. xvi and footnote 1 
(Rp 230); A 0230 and A 0231 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 196-197). 
12 
standing,34 had taken positions contrary to those espoused by David Mast,35 had been 
actively involved in significant political debates in the area dealing with the Utah Transit 
Authority budget, the Utah bid for the 2002 Olympics and the proposed light rail system,36 
and had even publicly sided with Commissioner Overson regarding the issue of allowing 
non-union bids on the construction for the expansion of the Salt Palace in Salt Lake City, 
Utah.37 By claiming that C.T.U. was "a ruse,38" and "strictly a front for David Mast,"39 
Commissioner Overson created a direct and indirect factual impression40 that would allow 
a reasonable citizen to conclude that Citizen Mast was engaging in criminal conduct41 or 
34
 A 0008 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 47); Affidavit of Scott Simons, fl 2 (Rp 272). 
35
 Affidavit of Randall Doyle, 1f 6 (Rp 384). 
36
 Affidavit of Scott Simons If 5 (Rp 273). 
37
 Id. 
38
 While a dictionary definition is not admittedly not definitive, the term "ruse" has 
been used to mean a failed plan of perjury, State v. Dodge, 425 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 
1967) or trying to sell a home one does not own. State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 
279 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Enticing one under penal statutes meant drawing another 
into a situation "by ruse or wiles." State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 356 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
39
 Uncontroverted Facts of Commissioner Overson # 42, pg. xvi and footnote 1 
(Rp 230); A 0230 and A 0231 (Affidavit of Ellis; Rp 196-197). 
40
 Statements that were defamatory on their face or defamatory by implication 
are actionable under Utah law. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1011 
(Utah 1994). 
41
 If C.T.U. was used by Citizen Mast as a deception, it could easily be 
contended that as President he had unlawfully dealt with the property of the corporation 
as a fiduciary, U.C.A. § 76-6-513, or that if the corporation was deemed not to exist 
under "alter-ego" theories, the funds received by C.T.U. (now alias Citizen Mast) had 
been obtained by deception in violation of U.C.A. § 76-6-405(1). 
13 
that Citizen Mast was the same as C.T.U.42 Either situation served to impeach Citizen 
Mast's "honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation and thereby exposefd] the individual to 
public hatred, contempt or ridicule."43 
If the court determines that the statements is capable of 
sustaining such a meaning as a matter of law, the trier of fact 
must then determine whether the statements was in fact so 
understood by its audience.44 
Citizen Mast submitted unrefuted evidence to the trial court that at a minimum after the 
defamatory press conference, newspapers began to report that C.T.U. was Mast's 
personal organization.45 Under these facts, the evidence before the trial court indicated 
that the statements of Commissioner Overson regarding Citizen Mast were defamatory. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Evidence Before the Court Adequately Challenged the Applicability of the 
Privileged Defenses Raised by Commissioner Overson. 
Commissioner Overson raised a number of "privileged" defenses in his motion for 
summary judgment that were not ruled upon by the trial court. In addition, a review of the 
record before the court indicates that as a matter of law these defenses do not apply to the 
defamatory language cited by Citizen Mast on appeal.46 
42
 Affidavit of David K. Mast, U 6 (Rp 265). 
43
 West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994). 
44
 Id. 
45
 Affidavit of David K. Mast, fl 6 (Rp 265). 
46
 These defenses were not responded to by Citizen Mast because of his 
pending Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. motion that requested discovery be allowed to explore the 
factual basis for the allegations made by Commissioner Overson as to these defenses. 
14 
ARGUMENT OF APPELLANT 
Background 
As noted by the trial court during oral argument, there existed questions of fact as 
to when Commissioner Overson was performing his duties when the defamatory material 
was published. As it related to the relationship between Citizen Mast and C.T.U., the only 
publication occurred when Commissioner Overson was holding a press conference at a 
public conference room of the County Building with the public relations firm hired to aid 
him with his successful re-election bid. The relationship of Citizen Mast and C.T.U. was 
not a matter of public interest, county concern, initiated by any member of the press, or 
involved in the official executive or legislative duties of Commissioner Overson. Holding 
a press conference and a responding full-page ad paid for by one's re-election committee 
creates at least a question of fact as to whether the expression occurred in response to 
one's official duties rather than personal re-election efforts. 
Second, the defense of "consent" does not apply in this case because Citizen Mast 
never claimed or placed at issue the relationship of himself with C.T.U. This information 
was not contained in either the opening newspaper add of C.T.U., any earlier letters, nor 
Nonetheless, as the arguments and evidence presented by Commissioner Overson on 
their face are sufficient to raise factual issues regarding the applicability of these 
defenses to the defamatory comments raised in the lower court and on this appeal, they 
may be appropriately reviewed at this time. Thus, not only was sufficient evidence in 
the record, the specific arguments raised in the record, but the failure of the trial court 
to consider them or recognize their inherent factual conflict constituted "plain error," 
which was both obvious to the trial court (as noted by the earlier exchanges between 
the court and Commissioner Oversows counsel) and was harmful to Citizen Mast. 
Thus, if required to do justice to Citizen Mast, the inherent errors associated with 
applying these defenses to this case may be reviewed on appeal. 
See State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 58 (Utah 1993). 
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the reply advertisement of Commissioner Overson. There was no consent to gratuitous 
attacks regarding a significant legal issue that had not been raised previously and of which 
there was evidence in the record to infer that Commissioner Overson had actual 
knowledge was false. 
Third, the accepted as valid Deseret News report of the press conference and the 
written comments prepared at the same do not contain any indication that the statements 
being made are expressions of opinion. Furthermore, Commissioner Overson admitted 
that protections afforded under Article I § 15 of the Utah Constitution do not apply when 
opinions state or imply facts that are false and defamatory.47 For reasons already in the 
record, the statements explicitly and implicitly state facts that are false and defamatory. 
Fourth, the qualified privilege of self-defense does not apply in this case because 
it was C.T.U. that published the article to which Commissioner Overson responded and 
Commissioner Oversows response was given to television and radio media rather than 
solely the newspaper media. Furthermore, contrary to Commissioner Oversows assertion 
to the trial court that calling the relationship of C.T.U. and Citizen Mast a "ruse" was 
appropriate because Citizen Mast had not disclosed to the public that he was a "real estate 
developer with a personal pecuniary interest in the dispute,"48 there is nothing in the record 
to Commissioner Oversows claim that C.T.U. was a "front" for Citizen Mast or part of a 
"ruse". Thus, the privilege of self-defense was neither limited in scope of issues nor in 
47
 West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1015 (Utah 1994). 
48
 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 
page 10(Rp240). 
16 
audience. It is apparent that a question of fact as to malice was also created by the 
Affidavits submitted in support of the Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. motion that indicated that 
Commissioner Overson had previous experiences indicating these statements were false. 
Fifth, Commissioner Overson's incantation of a privilege to protect one's personal 
interest (which obviously is contradictory to any executive privilege) does not create a 
qualified privilege to attack directly and indirectly Citizen Mast by claiming that a valid, 
political action corporation is in fact his "front" or was part of a "ruse" to deceive the people 
of Salt Lake County. For reasons noted earlier, it would also appear that the privilege was 
excessively published and done with malice. 
Sixth, the legal relationship of Citizen Mast and C.T.U. is not a matter of public 
interest when both are operating in accordance with the laws of Utah. Commissioner 
Overson did not need to address that at all to inform citizenry on matters of either public 
concern or relative to his re-election campaign. Questions of fact are raised sufficient to 
prevent a ruling that there was no excessive publication and there was no malice. 
Seventh, even if Citizen Mast was a public figure as to matters relative to the 
development of a golf course on South Mountain, he was not a public figure as to his 
relationship with C.T.U. The affidavits submitted with the Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. motion 
showed by undisputed evidence that C.T.U. and Citizen Mast were in fact separate as a 
matter of law. Thus, the defamatory statements before the trial court were in error as a 
matter of law. Furthermore, they also showed that the actions of C.T.U. had been of a 
long-standing nature and were, in fact, known and in at least one situation, encouraged 
by Commissioner Overson. Under these facts, there is at least a disputed question of fact 
17 
whether or not there was actual malice, which would defeat the application of a summary 
judgment in this situation. 
Eighth, Commissioner Oversows record is not complete enough to demonstrate that 
as a matter of law Commissioner Overson is protected by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
This can be shown in two ways. First, for reasons outlined as to why he is not entitled to 
Executive Immunity, there is a serious question of fact as to whether or not his defamatory 
statements regarding C.T.U. and Citizen Mast were made "during the performance of the 
employee's duties within the scope of employment, or under the color of authority."49 
Second, the Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. affidavits that establish the long-standing separate 
relationship between C.T.U. and Citizen Mast and Commissioner Oversows knowledge of 
the same, create a factual basis for an inference that the conduct of Commissioner 
Overson was conduct that was malicious. If so, by his own motion for summary judgment, 
the conduct of Commissioner Overson is exempt from the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court prematurely determined to grant the Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment because it failed to consider all of the record before it and improperly denied the 
Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P. motion of Citizen Mast to take the deposition of Commissioner 
Overson. Furthermore, even if the trial court properly limited the evidence that it 
considered, the trial court erroneously granted the motion of Commissioner Overson 
because the statements that were made regarding Citizen Mast and his relationship to 
^U.C.A. §63-30-4(3)(a). 
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C.T.U. were in fact defamatory as a matter of law. Privileged defenses either did not apply 
as a matter of law or were subject to conflicting evidence as to their applicability. 
For all of the foregoing, the Utah Court of Appeals should reverse the summary 
judgment granted in favor of the Defendant and remand the case for reargument and 
consideration of the defenses presented but not ruled upon after appropriate discovery has 
been made. 
DATED this 7th day of February, 1998. 
NELSON, SNUBFER & DAHLE 
Denver Snuffeij 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant David Mast 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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IN AND FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY , STATE' "' !"' I'" I" MI 
-oOo-
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
" PERSON, 
Defendant. 
Ci vi 1 No. 960907782 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
(Videotape Proceedings^ 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 9th day of June, 
oiraaencing at the hour r * the above-
entitled matter came u; II ^NORABL.E 
WILLIAM H. THORNE, sitting as Judge in the above-named 
purpose of thi s cause, and that the 
.ollowing videotape proceedings were IlikulL 
-oOo-
"
:
 A JEL P E A. R A N C E S 
laintiff: 
tne Defendant: 
DENVER C. SNUFFEI ., 1 IE 
Attorney at Law 
Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
JAY D. GURMANKIN 
Attorney at Law 
Berman, Gaufin# Tomsic & 
Savage 
50 South Main Street 
Suite 1250 
Salt Lake Ci 4 
- i 
V^'L-
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
''t^iyiffit 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Okay. We're on the 
record in 960907782, Mast vs. Overson. 
Counsel, would you make an appearance so the 
record is complete? 
MR. SNUFFER: Denver Snuffer 
appearing, your Honor, on behalf of the plaintiff, Mr. 
Mast. 
MR. GURMANKIN: Jay Gurmankin and 
Richard (inaudible) appearing for defendant, Brent 
Overson. 
THE COURT: Okay. I understand you 
have a guest with you; is that your daughter or your 
associate's daughter? 
MR. GURMANKIN: I do, your Honor. 
This is my daughter, Tallia. (Inaudible) school today 
and the clerk graciously offered to allow her to sit 
here. 
THE COURT: Well, that's fine, I 
don't have a problem with that at all. 
Okay. I guess, Counsel, the first matter would 
be 5(f), is it? 
MR. SNUFFER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Snuffer? 
2 
SNUFFER: Thank you, your Honor. 
•i have new
 m i c r 0 p h 0 n e s 
THE COURT: You can bend that down 
/ou want, as long as It's pointed 
towards you, record. 
Kh SNUFFER: Well , 1 think i t 
ackground, first 
procedural background vt 
the moment, and then secondarily about what the facts are 
Mb^tance of—of tho claim. 
Procedurally, the Court should 
lawsuit was filed on the 8th of November, 1996. During 
the attorney : -"*•••• 
defendant requested additional tinu LC prepare a response 
-o the—to the complaint. 
iwf iliscussed additional time to 
~M e an answer; however, uit subsequent 
correspondence, it :c correct, as Mr. Gurmankin has 
i i in I nanswer c i: otherwise 
respond". ;u;
 m want Lo be too technical about that, 
nut i t was agreed on December 30th, there was a letter 
.. i i t ::' ::)i if I i: i areement - hat they would have 
until January . ^ answer and then on 
the 14th—excuse me, we gave them until January 16th. 
asked for additional 
3 
time, we granted them additional time on January 14th to 
January 27th. 
So, they have the complaint in November, we 
have the letters agreeing to continuances of their 
response on December 30th and again on January 14th. 
Their response was due on January 27th. 
The response that they filed on January 27th 
was a series of motions. They filed a motion to: Number 
one, enlarge time to answer or respond to the complaint; 
number two, to stay discovery in this case; and number 
three, a motion for summary judgment. 
Because of the pending motion to enlarge time 
to file an answer, there has been no answer filed by the 
defendant in this case. At this moment, the pleadings 
aren't closed. 
Because of the motion to stay discovery, the 
defendants have refused to cooperate in discovery pending 
the outcome of these proceedings. 
We noticed up the deposition of Brent Overson 
initially in December. We sent it for the end of 
December, they refused to produce him. We noticed up the 
deposition of Brent Overson again for February the 18th. 
Again, they refused to produce him. We were told that 
they would not produce him because there's a pending 
motion to stay discovery. 
4 
Randy Dyer " ' 
I have a transcript c . those proceedings. He didn't show 
up and won't show up unless there is a—unless there Is 
THE COURT: Why were you taking his 
deposition? 
information, because of his involvement with Mr. Overson, 
about the allegations that ->• -^  r~ * in this case. 
the pleadings are not closed and there has been i 10 
discovery conducted, although there has been discovery 
attemptec • . i i • • ei: y 
unti1 after you rule and L: yo,, rule that the discovery 
j s i ici) t stayed, then we'll be permitted by the defendant 
to then engage in discovery. 
That's—that's the procedural state V A we're 
terms of the underlying relationship between 
the parties, we filed an affidavit from Mr. Scott Simons 
that talks about the background *••' -.he entity known as 
the Concerned Taxpayer^ 
corporation, : t. 's been involved— 
THE COURT: The one that had lapsed 
c;,.., :Y"*r* reinstated? 
5 
MR. SNUFFER: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. SNUFFER: It's been involved in a 
variety of matters of public interest. They were 
involved in a dispute involving the Utah Transit 
Authority. There's actually a lawsuit filed by the 
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah over the Utah Transit 
Authority. 
There was an issue involving Utah's bid for the 
2002 Olympics, there were issues involving light rail 
system and two of the Salt Lake County Commissioners 
wanted to limit bids on the Salt Palace expansion 
exclusively to union bids and Mr. Overson didn't want 
that to happen. 
He asked the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah to 
intervene and assist with his view that it should be open 
for everyone. The Concerned Taxpayers of Utah did in 
fact join in a lawsuit, among others, seeking to open the 
bids up to something other than exclusively union bids. 
As a result of that litigation, the bids were 
opened up and non-union bids were permitted on that; so 
Mr. Overson knows about the background of the Concerned 
Taxpayers of Utah. 
When the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah placed a 
full-page ad in the newspaper, which is attached to— 
6 
THE COURT: It was one oi the 
exhibits. 
SNUFFER: Right. Exhibit 28. 
Nowhere—nowhere in » He document does **& name 
"* David Mast appear Nowhere. ID 
*ne oncerned Taxpayers of Utah. It identifies it as a 
i urn I i mi:a Iks about * talks 
about where i JIIM it and what -epnune number 
**,. *w is the Concerned— 
THE COURTi Ve rt Mr. Mast one 
f the directors — officers identitiea wirh 
Department of Corporations? 
SNUFFER: Yes I Hit this was not 
Mr. Mast. This was a separate corporate entity called 
*"? Poncerned Taxpayers of Utah. There was no reason to 
,
 ( i I i I » l^\ MI ilverson 
. p r o b l e m — 
THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, like 
i u r e s t i M "i i i i i i i i n in i I I | i t i in I in '"I'll in 
you get into the facts, if we get that far. 
MR. SNUFFER: Okay. response to 
esponse 
attacked directly David Mast. 
: doe.;:, t mention the Concerned 
'. i ., . - whatever 
7 
1 yourself. 
2
 There have been various defenses that have been 
3 asserted in a motion for summary judgment by the 
4 defendant, which include as a substantive requirement, 
5
 that we show—assuming their defenses are valid—that it 
8 requires us to show that Mr. Overson made the statements 
7 that he made with malice, at the time that he made them. 
8 And at this moment, the only thing that we can 
9 say to the Court is, well, he made them with malice. If 
10 we're not allowed to go and cross-examine Mr. Overson 
11 about his motivation, about the words he chose, about why 
12 he chose them, about what he was thinking at the time 
13 that he elected to do that, whether he considered the 
14 effect that that would have, whether there were other 
15 words he could have used to get the same message out, I 
16 don't see how we can attack the alleged defenses that 
17 have been raised. 
18 When dealing with a 56(f) motion, the defendant 
19 cite as their chief authority, the Callo vs. Progressive 
20 Insurance Company case and in that case, it talks about 
21 our obligation as a 56(f) movement, to show what steps 
22 have been taken to obtain the desired information 
23 pursuant to the discovery procedures under the rules. 
24 We have notices of depositions as a matter of 
25 record, it's in—in the—it's in the Court's file. 
8 
THE COURT: But doesn't the case law 
~^n-i require you to at least lay J it *:lir JaeiL juu lit'i-t/ 
or expect to find as a result of that discovery? 
SNUFFER: And I believe that we 
did that -'- the affidavit of Mr. Mast and
 r e p l y 
memorandum. 
attackinq the motivation of 
Overson unless we're given access and an opportunity 
to cross-examine him. 
. : THE COURT i Ok: i t ] »' Bi :i I: a g a :i i :i th e c a s e 
law se-:;ni5; to say that: laving all the facts ^. ...,..,„ 
possession of - side and not ZL- ther is n o t — n o t :::: 
MR. SNUFFER: Well — 
THE COURT -requirement. 
Mast. 
THE COURT Paragraph a -; 
only through discovery. That's the language that the 
Supreme Court has said is insufficient. 
r . I | J T T T ? T 7 T ? P • •  -
 # 
Paragraph 8, I question uit- claim of Mr. Overson, that 
was actinq under ? qualified privilege, that he deserves 
9 
Overson to challenge those claims and believe if I'm 
permitted to do—to take his deposition, I will 
successfully be able to do so. 
Mr. Overson did not couch the statements he 
made as opinions at the time of the news conference. 
Without being able to obtain copies of video and audio 
tapes and conduct the deposition of Mr. Overson, not be 
able to fully oppose the allegation that this was an 
expression of opinion; I need to take the deposition of 
Mr. Overson in order to oppose the allegation that the 
statements he made were in self defense. 
Without the transcript of the video-audio 
tapes, I can't take the deposition of Mr. Overson and 
fully oppose the claim he makes that the statements were 
made in self defense. The statements were not self 
defense, but rather an attack on me intended to disparage 
and defame me and my reputation. 
If there is a self defense here, it goes to the 
concerned taxpayers of Utah, not Mr. David Mast 
personally. 
Without the deposition of Mr. Overson, I cannot 
fully explore, challenge or refute the allegations he 
makes that the statements were made to protect a 
legitimate interest, a matter of public interest or his 
claims of (inaudible) 
10 
U p r n t j f i f f | i , t u f * * , | | ( | ( *K (> i y | |) | 1141 M i d i | | p -i r I I I I 
without ever mentioning Dave Mast. He could have engaged 
in t he d ia logue t h a t he engaged - without ever 
menti 01 11 i ig Mr Mas t I t wa . J I} • urmectisscir >• . i n I 
gratuitous for the identity of an individual, the 
personality of an individual to be singled out. 
Why 
THE COURT: Okay. Counsel, I th i nk 
we're—you're going into the merits of the case as 
opposed to, ;| ou pointed c sedur e. t :: s t:a 
MR. SNUFFER: Right. Right. 
And what I'm saying is we believe the affidavit 
Is sufficient U.
 r. . -: 
engage in discovery, particularly so when the pleadings 
closed and there has been no discovery 
permittee .-. ;:..., point. 
*: Callo case, "; talks about, y o u — y o u 
sh ::>i ill :ii i I: engage :i i :i purely- - cishing expedition for 
purely speculative facts after substantial disco ery lias 
been conducted without producing any significant 
evidence. 
There has been 1 i Use 
case up to this moment None Nothing has been 
responded >. 
Was there sufficient time sine. 
J I 
1
 of the lawsuit for the party against whom the summary 
2
 judgment is sought to use discovery procedures and 
3
 thereby cross-examine the moving party? 
4 We've attempted to do that. We've been 
5 attempting to do that since late December. We've been 
6 told they will not cooperate because of the pending 
7 motion to stay discovery. They act as if there is an 
8 order staying discovery until the Court rules in this 
9 case. 
10 if discovery procedures were timely initiated, 
11 was the non-moving party afforded an appropriate 
12 response? Well, it's not an appropriate response for 
13 them to simply say, we're blowing you off until the Judge 
14 tells us otherwise. We're entitled to have some 
15 discovery. 
16 Their— 
17 THE COURT: Counsel, is there a 
18 reason (Inaudible) not simply to consider as a motion to 
19 dismiss as opposed to a summary judgment? 
20 MR. SNUFFER: Well, they've couched 
21 it in terms of Rule 56. I think it—I think it is a Rule 
22 56 motion. 
23 Are you suggesting you could dismiss it without 
24 prejudice as a—as a motion to dismiss for failure to 
25 state? 
12 
THE COURT: If I accept your argument 
that you haven't 
SNUFFER: Right. 
THE COURT: you meet 
requirements, then another pos^i \ 
with these motions is a motion tc dismiss. The defendant 
i Ill, 1,11 mi ' as a matter of law, certain 
claims cannot support complaint,. 
SNUFFER: ' ~ nderstand that 
matter of xaw, uiicj nave a 
variety of privileges. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
SNUFFER: Assuming those 
privileges are true, they still can be sued Jtur--tor 
defamation, assuming the motivation that they have 
motivation. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SNUFFER: In order for me to get 
I I i 11 i I -Hi'i mill i(i'- hat becomes— 
THE COURT: understand your 
argument the merits, but I'm just asking you, is that 
translate these motions wi; 
, ~ • : understand you have „,, argument against grant., 
such a motion. 
SNUFFER: We] ] , 1 mean, ii \ 
13 
1
 fairness to the Court, I think you—I think you can do 
2
 that. I think you can treat it as such. 
3 I—I mean, standing here, it's my recollection, 
4
 that procedurally, that has been approved by the Court of 
5
 Appeals and I know that it has been done by District 
6 Courts before. You wouldn't be plowing new ground were 
7 you to do so; but let me suggest that if that were the 
8 alternative or the option selected this morning, the 
9 problem is that—that doesn't do anything to the 
10 litigants, that doesn't do anything to the issue and 
11 we're still—I mean, the matter will be yet again raised 
12 for yet another judge and as long as we've got you and 
13 we've got the matter before you, it makes sense to not 
14 bounce it, but to treat—I mean, we're back again to 
15 serving process, filing, and you may draw the case again 
16 in the random selection of the clerk's office. So— 
17 THE COURT: How long—how long do you 
18 think you would need to conduct enough discovery to at 
19 least address those motions? 
20 MR. SNUFFER: I believe that—that 
21 the deposition of Mr. Overson himself is potentially 
22 dispositive of all of their defense. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 MR. SNUFFER: If we're given an 
25 opportunity to take his deposition. 
14 
limited to just the questions * >:-•- and n o t — 
M-: SNUFFER: Just the questions— 
Mr SNUFFER: at t m s moment, just 
tue—the I ssues that have been raised ;- the motion for 
summary judgment iswere*. 
.-at their answer will include or if they will come up 
! ) new defenses at some future moment. 
10 T H E C O U R T , IJOII: I" i; : J i . 
1 1 MI-I SNUFFER: But as to those matters 
12 r -- •* : issue because of summary judgment, that would 
13 _ v.; .. • we would need L La A i him about. 
1 1 Another way to get. It and it might be more cost 
15 -rjffective and—and it may be considerably more 
16 | expeditious is for the Court to say, wait » minute, 
answer. Answer. Frame the issues. 
18 After you answer, then we'll take the 
19 deposition of Mr. Overson and then., as one of the cases 
20 suggest, you can renew—this is the—the Strand vs. 
21 I Associated Students U of [J, the case is found at 561 
2^ . Pacific Reporter at \<* . 
23 The Court says, -*.;.-• abuse of discretion 
2- arant defendant's motion. urt should have 
2D ordered the continuance to perm-. scovery or denied the 
1
 motion for summary judgment without prejudice to its 
2
 renewal, after adequate time had elapsed in which 
3 plaintiff could have obtained the desired information. 
4 i believe in the end, from the cases, you've 
5
 got considerable discretion at this moment. I think 
6
 there are limits on that and we, I think, are at the 
7 extreme, an outrageous end of whether, is this an abuse? 
8
 I mean, no answer, no discovery, no cooperation in 
9 discovery and summary judgment pending. 
10 i think wisdom being the better part of valor, 
11
 the thing to do would be to say, frame the issues, file 
12 your answer, let's get the issue so we know what it is, 
13 let's not take an incremental deposition and then take 
14 another deposition if the ones asserted at that moment 
15 failed—if the defenses asserted at that moment failed, 
16 then think up some new ones, file your answer and then 
17 they can talk to you about those new ones at that moment. 
18 That seems rather— 
19 THE COURT: Well, it's hard for me to 
20 imagine finding new ones. This seems to be pretty 
21 thorough. 
22 MR. SNUFFER: You never know. 
23 Attorneys are so inventive. And I (inaudible) so Mr.— 
24 Mr. Gurmankin is inventive. 
25 My suggestion would be that—that— 
16 
T H E COURT m i n k , I  Ill i urn iiiiriiik i l l , 
k^ meant that as a compliment. 
' TUFFER: 1 did. x ^x^. 
And my suggestion would— 
MR. GURMANKIN: ! just wish it were 
MR. SNUFFER: My suggestion woui 
to frame the pleadings, to continue the motion. " •-,*• 
^ntiortunity conduct 
some discovery If this is the—the waterfronr the 
defenses that they intend to assert, fine; > there's yet 
,uore out LIIUMI: i," ~- ' ~ qive 
us some pleading, give us an opportunity _, „ „,..,, at that 
so. 
G e t II In j i i f c J i e s Irani*-1 Il ii n< I ill niiiv 1""»«=J| t h . i t : a s a 
result " the deposition of Mr. Overson, that he and his 
attorney ma motivated t*.- tv and settle this case. 
^,d there .: 
case, including an- a retraction ;.;: some things that he's 
20 I said. 
And 111 J !. d ue t '" I i • I I 111 11 f "11 vi dua 1 
22 reputation of Mr. Mast, There's cm organization out 
there, too, that has an interest i~. seeing that these 
proceedings come 
homogenized into a single entity. Their representative, 
1 which is also present, watching these proceedings this 
2 morning. 
3 That would be my suggestion. I don't think we 
4 ought to bounce it as a—as a motion to dismiss. I don't 
5 think it saves on Court time or the parties' time. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 
7 MR. SNUFFER: Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Gurmankin? 
9 MR. GURMANKIN: Good morning, your 
10 Honor. 
11 First, just let me comment on a couple points 
12 made by Mr. Snuffer in the course of his argument on the 
13 56(f) motion. 
14 First of all, I never promised him an answer. 
15 i haven't promised anybody an answer in— 
16 THE COURT: Sounds like the words to 
17 a song. 
18 MR. GURMANKIN: —in twenty answers— 
19 in twenty years, I haven't promised anybody an answer. 
20 Secondly, I never heard of this notice of 
21 deposition of Randy Dryer or Randy Dyer. I—this is a—a 
22 surprise to me. 
23 Third, I will tell the Court, and the record 
24 will speak for itself, there's never been a proper notice 
25 of deposition served on Mr. Overson; but I would have 
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opposed it and filed a motion for protective order along 
with my motion for stay anyway. 
My position is that on this record, the defen— 
the plaintiff having failed to respond, at least to the 
extent he could have, I think he could have responded 
totally, everything that we've said in our statement of 
facts is deemed admitted under Rule 56 and our papers go 
unopposed. 
I will tell the Court there's nothing 
surprising about this procedure of filing a motion for 
summary judgment in response to a complaint. 
We've cited in our papers to Professor 
Mooresbook and I'll cite the Court—I was reading through 
the advance sheets the other day, why I was reading that 
as opposed to things about the Jazz, I don't know; but in 
my small and meaningless life, I was looking at the 
advance sheets and I found a case called Thrower vs. 
Barney. 849 F.Supp 1445, a Federal District Court 
opinion. 
As your Honor knows, under the Federal rules, 
we don't have any discovery for about 120 days and the 
Court said, the amended rules contemplate that no 
discovery shall be undertaken until after the parties 
meet and confer; however, they don't stand in the way of 
filing a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary 
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1
 judgment before discovery. 
2 That's what the defendants did in this case and 
3
 because the Court basically said there's nothing— 
4 nothing—no discovery here is going to help you, it 
5 couldn't, as a matter of law, the Court dismissed the 
6 case. 
7 There's no question under the—the law stated 
8 in Callio vs. Progressive Insurance, which we've cited 
9 and which Mr. Snuffer alluded to, that the 56(f) 
10 affidavit and the 56(f) motion are completely inadequate 
11 to raise any questions. 
12 And—and that Court—the Court said the Callio 
13 conclusary assertion that schedules deposition (sic) were 
14 expected to produce matters essential to resolution of 
15 the defendant's motion, that's exactly what Mr. Mast's 
16 affidavit is. It doesn't really tell us at all what 
17 kinds of areas he could explore that would—that would 
18 raise issues of controverted fact with respect to the 
19 things I~ 
20 THE COURT: I—I think I agree with 
21 you in terms of the affidavit, but there are three parts 
22 to that requirement the Judge (inaudible) and I'm 
23 concerned about the second requirement. 
24 The one that says, was there sufficient time 
25 since the inception of the lawsuit for the party against 
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whom summary judgment is sought— 
MR. GURMANKIN: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: —to use discovery 
procedures and by cross-examining the moving party. 
MR. GURMANKIN: And—and my answer to 
that, your Honor, and the reason we filed this motion to 
stay discovery is because on the record we've made and 
the—the documents, the law, no matter what Mr. Overson 
says at his deposition, this case still has to be 
dismissed as a matter of law, for a number of reasons. 
THE COURT: Even with the presence of 
malice, if they're able to document that? 
MR. GURMANKIN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GURMANKIN: The answer is yes. 
THE COURT: Tell me. 
MR. GURMANKIN: And to do that, I 
need to get to the merits. I—let me just say, and I 
won't go through all the other law in 56(f) where the 
Courts always say, you can't just file conclusary 
statements. 
I wonder about the questions they'd ask Mr. 
Overson about malice, but—but let me say, there's two 
kinds of malice that float around these cases. The one 
is in the Constitutional sense to get around New York 
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Times vs. Sullivan, knowing something's false or reckless 
disregard of the fact. 
The other is common law malice and that's what 
comes up in these qualified privileges and that's ill 
will and for a number of reasons, as a matter of law, no 
matter what Mr. Overson says at his deposition on this 
record, you can determine there was no malice, but I will 
also tell the Court that on another—number of our 
defend—defenses, malice is irrelevant. 
Mr. Overson had the right to defame him, even,-
-if he did, I don't concede that—and because of the 
limited scope of what Mr. Overson said in defense of 
himself—by the way, Mr. Mast's name is all over these 
documents and I'll show them to you—as a matter of law, 
there is no malice. And we've cited cases on that and 
this Court can decide that as a matter of law. 
So, Mr. Snuffer's obligation under the 56(f) 
motion was to show what kinds of issues he could raise at 
this deposition that would go to show the kind of malice 
that would get around our arguments. He didn't do that 
and he didn't say anything that could possibly redo a 
dis—to a controverted fact on absolute immunity, on the 
absolute defense that this is opinion, which I think you 
can decide, as a matter of law, on the absolute defense 
based on this record under Utah law that this—these 
22 
statements are not, even if he made them, capable of a 
defamatory meaning. 
So, if Mr. Overson, for example, sat in his 
deposition and said, yeah, I don't like Mr. Mast, that's 
not the kind of malice that will get around here. 
The cases that I'm going to go into, when we 
get to the merits, are going to show that if somebody is 
attacked, as he was, attacked as having done things wrong 
and attacked as having done things criminal, publicly 
attacked by Mr. Mast, not just by the C.T.U.—and—and 
I'll show, I think, that it is a ruse, not only were his 
statements all true, but they were carefully limited in 
scope to defend himself. 
If your Honor looks at the complaint, there's 
not a lot. All he said was there was an add that was 
done by a bunch of people, all the commissioners, parks 
and recreation, you know, I mean that ad has nothing 
defamatory in it. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) publications 
by an election committee? 
MR. GURMANKIN: Well, that's what he 
says except the ad is—is not that—"The Facts" ad is not 
that. I have it here, it's in the record. 
The other thing he said, all he said was none 
of the things he said is true—are true. This is Overson 
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1
 talking, and that's clear on the record, and then he 
2 said, how long does a public official have to put up with 
3 a bunch of defamation or lies? 
4 Assuming that's a defamatory statement in the 
5 first place, which I doubt it is, because of the context 
6 and in the West case, the Utah Supreme Court talked about 
7 the importance of context with respect to whether 
8 something is capable of a—of a defamatory meaning, all 
9 he was doing was defending himself. 
10 The question is, would someone believe that 
11 that has cast enough aspersions on Mr. Mast to—to ruin— 
12 cause him some kind of ruination? Was—it's not even 
13 claimed to be defamatory per se. 
14 So, what kinds of questions can he ask Mr. 
15 Overson that matter on this record? And my position is, 
16 that given the eight or nine legal defenses that I've 
17 invented, that—and by the way, I may have one or two 
18 more, if we ever did have to answer, but I haven't raised 
19 them because they might create questions of fact. These 
20 don't create any questions of fact. 
21 And I will say for the record that Mr. Snuffer 
22 has completely failed to do what he has to do and I'll 
23 just talk about one case on 56(f) and that is the party 
24 filing the affidavit must show how additional time will 
25 enable him to rebut movant's allegations of no genuine 
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1 issue of fact. 
2
 Not just that there hasn't been time, but how 
3
 can he show that he could rebut any of our facts with 
4
 facts that are material. He hasn't done that, he failed 
5 under 56(f). 
6 Not only that, not only did he fail to—to do 
7
 that, he didn't—he didn't even try to refute all the 
8
 facts that he has the possession of. He didn't—he 
9 didn't deny he's a competing developer. He didn't deny 
10 he went to Doug Short and tried to get a grand jury 
11 convened. He didn't deny that he was responsible for the 
12 attacks that the C.T.U. and he made. 
13 He could have denied those and his duty under 
14 Rule 56(f) was to do that independent of 56(f). He left 
15 this record naked, and I will say, your Honor, two 
16 things: One, he hasn't met his burden under 56(f) to 
17 allow for more discovery, and even more important, this 
18 record stands unrebutted and as a matter of law, our 
19 facts have to be deemed admitted and we're entitled to 
20 summary judgment. 
21 Now, I'll get to the merits later. And I'll 
22 answer any questions the Court has. Mr. Snuffer took a 
23 big risk by doing what he did and he violated Rule 56. 
24 And I'll—let me say one thing. Absolute 
25 immunity. Absolute immunity. No facts can go to that. 
25 
Obviously, Mr. Overson is the executive of the county. 
How is—how is discovery going to—going to change that? 
THE COURT: Mr. Snuffer? 
MR. SNUFFER: Yeah. I think the 
Callo case and the requirement under the second part of 
the test is consistent with the predecessor, the Strand 
case that I referred you to earlier, and I'd like to read 
from it. 
Unless dilatory or lacking in merits, the 
motion should be liberally treated. Exercising a sound 
discretion, the trial court then determines whether the 
stated reasons are adequate. 
And they—they talked about how in this case 
there had not been sufficient time since the inception of 
the lawsuit for plaintiff to utilize discovery procedures 
and thereby have an opportunity to cross-examine the 
moving party. The pleadings had not been closed, there 
were complex, legal issues posed with an inadequate 
factual basis. 
Under such circumstances, it was an abuse of 
discretion to grant the defendant's motion. The Court 
should have ordered a continuance to permit discovery or 
denied the motion for summary judgment without prejudice 
to its renewal after adequate time had elapsed in which 
plaintiff could have obtained the desired information. 
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1 I wanted to point out, you asked about the 
2
 deposition of Randy Dryer. Randy Dryer was, at one 
3 point, the attorney who represented Mr. Overson in which 
4
 Mr. Overson and Randy Dryer met with representatives of 
5 the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah including not just Mr. 
6 Mast, but multiple other parties. 
7 The spokesman of that meeting was Randy Doyle 
8 and Dryer and Overson and Doyle, with Mast sitting in the 
9 background, listening, reached an agreement in which they 
10 went forward with a policy change that saved the 
11 taxpayers ultimately a considerable amount of money. 
12 For Mr. Overson now to come along a couple of 
13 years later and say, Dave Mast is the alter ego of and 
14 this is all motivated by and Mr. Mast, Mr. Mast, Mr. Mast 
15 is wrong. 
16 THE COURT: But you didn't controvert 
17 that in your affidavit. 
18 MR. SNUFFER: Well, the question is 
19 not what the facts are, because the—the supporting 
20 information attached to their own motion demonstrates 
21 that the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah and David Mast are 
22 two separate entities. They demonstrate that. 
23 The question is, should Mr. Overson who knows 
24 the statement to have been false, get away with calling 
25 Dave Mast a liar because of something the Concerned 
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1
 Taxpayers of Utah did. 
2 And he's turning Mr. Mast into Concerned 
3 Taxpayers of Utah and blasting Mr. Mast personally as a 
4
 liar, when his gripe, if there is one, is with the 
5 Concerned Taxpayers of Utah. 
6 And that's what the attorney's doing for him, 
7 too. Gurmankin is getting up here and homogenizing them, 
8 and we're saying, no, no, you can't do that. 
9 And if we had had the deposition of Mr. Dryer, 
10 we would demonstrate to you that there is ample history 
11 that goes back over years that Mr. Overson knows the 
12 difference between David Mast, on the one hand, and the 
13 Concerned Taxpayers of Utah. And if he had it right and 
14 he wanted to call anyone a liar, he should aim more 
15 accurately and not at the individual. 
16 His gripe, if there was one, was with the 
17 Concerned Taxpayers of Utah. That's certainly adequately 
18 before you in this record and I would return again to the 
19 statement made in the U of U Students case that the 
20 pleadings aren't closed, no discovery has been permitted. 
21 We're at something before a preliminary state 
22 in this case, notwithstanding what happens on the Federal 
23 side, which some folks think is inefficient and dilatory 
24 just by its very nature, I mean it gives Federal District 
25 Court Judges just a lot of time and magistrates a lot of 
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1
 time before they have to do anything in a case that's 
2
 initiated; thankfully, we don't have that here. 
3
 And we should have been—I mean, this case 
4
 began in November and here we are, arguing a motion 
5
 months later with them taking the stonewall approach to 
6 the case because of pending motions, 
7 i think we should get on, conduct some 
8 discovery, close the—frame the pleadings, close the 
9 pleadings and give us an opportunity. They can renew 
10 their motion. 
11 At this point, the only one that's been 
12 prejudiced in this is the plaintiff. The defendants have 
13 filed a bunch of motions and sat back and done nothing 
14 and they'll continue to do nothing unless the Court 
15 orders otherwise. 
16 if the Court has questions, I'm prepared to 
17 speak further, but I think the matter is before your 
18 Honor. Thank you. 
19 THE COURT: Thank you. 
20 Mr. Gurmankin? 
21 MR. GURMANKIN: Yes, your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Point me towards the—I 
23 now that you are suggesting that—that all eight or nine 
24 of your arguments survive any kind of a factual inquiry. 
25 MR. GURMANKIN: Uh huh. 
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THE COURT: So, help me walk through 
those and show me why whatever Mr. Snuffer discovers on 
discovery would make no difference, 
MR. GURMANKIN: All right. And I'll-
-I'll do it quickly, your Honor, I won't go— 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GURMANKIN: First ground. 
Incapable of sustaining a defamatory meaning as a matter 
of law. Under the West case and the Cox case, they are 
clearly under Utah law a question of law; in other words, 
the question whether something's capable of the 
defamatory meaning is a question of law based on the 
context. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. GURMANKIN: And here, you have 
plenty of context that there had been attacks on—on Mr. 
Overson by Mast, not just the C.T.U., but by Mr. Mast 
personally, it's in the record. Goes and tries to get a 
grand jury convened, all Mr. Overson did was protect 
himself and my position is as a matter of law, no matter 
what was in his mind, that statement—and you know, all 
those statements are always made with some ill will, 
that's incapable of defamatory meaning. 
Absolute executive officer—oh, no, immunity is 
the second one. The Fender case we've cited. That is an 
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absolute immunity to defame--* 
i THE COURT: No, 
for just a second, Mr. Gurmankin— 
MR. GURMANKIN: 
no, let me back up 
Okay. 
them at a time. 
THE COURT: —and deal with one of 
MR. GURMANKIN: All right. 
THE COURT: And I don't mean t o — 
MR. GURMANKIN: I'm sorry, I was 
just— 
THE COURT: —past my threshold with 
hanging on to all of those ideas. 
MR. GURMANKIN: And I—your Honor, I-
-I hate to interrupt, but I have—I'm ready to go into 
each one of more at more length, if your Honor— 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, maybe we 
ought to take that approach then. 
The incapable of defamatory meaning, from 
reading the complaint, there's one area that they deal 
with that ad and the response; but isn't there also sort 
of a general pleading that—I'm having difficulty in 
pinning down as to what—what you're talking about. 
How can you say that whatever that is is 
incapable of defamatory meaning when I'm not sure what it 
is they're complaining about? 
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MR. GURMANKIN: Okay. The complaint 
says what they're complaining about, which was an ad—let 
me get it, your Honor. 
May I speak from the— 
THE COURT: Sure. That's fine. 
MR. GURMANKIN: Because I will fumble 
less. 
THE COURT: That's fine. That's 
fine. 
MR. GURMANKIN: The complaint. It 
only has two areas which they claim are defamatory. One 
is that the defendant accused plaintiff of being a liar 
and that the C.T.U. is an alleged ruse. 
And secondly was a newspaper ad, the facts. 
Your Honor, obviously, when a party is confronted with a 
motion for summary judgment, the party cannot rely on the 
pleadings, he—but has to make a record of what the 
statements were. 
That's one of the things that troubles me about 
this. Where are the defamatory statements? All right. 
There's two of them. One of them is this: The facts. 
Exhibit 31 to the Ellis affidavit, signed by Randy 
Horiuchi, Mary Callahan, the mayor of Draper, Mr. 
Overson, the County Parks Board chair and the County Golf 
Advisory chair and I will ask the Court to read this and 
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1 determine as a matter of law not only is the word, David 
2
 Mast not mentioned, not only is the C.T.U. not mentioned, 
3
 but there is nothing in here that a person in the 
4 farthest stretch of his or her imagination could conclude 
5 is defamatory. It's just—it's just as a matter of law 
6 not defamatory 'cause there's nothing negative said about 
7 it in here at all. Okay. That's one of their bases. 
8 Second basis is the press conference. So we 
9 put it in the record. And at the press conference, Mr. 
10 overson did say, and we admit for the purposes of this 
11 motion, that the C.T.U. is a ruse and he didn't—he 
12 didn't call Mr. Mast a liar, what he said was, he asked 
13 in exasperation, How long does a public official have to 
14 put up with attacks? 
15 so, what he said was, full page newspaper ad is 
16 politically motivated, mean-spirited and a sham. I 
17 submit to you as a matter of law, none of that is 
18 defamatory. 
19 The ad was placed for and paid for by David 
20 Mast. We have evidence in the record to that extent and 
21 that wasn't controverted. That's true. As a matter of 
22 law, that's true, because they admitted and there's facts 
23 in the record and he obviously did pay for the ad and if 
24 he said he didn't, I think he'd be perjuring himself. 
25 David Mast is a real estate developer. No 
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1
 question. It's in the record, he hasn't denied it, I 
2 don't think he'll deny it today.- He's a competitor, too, 
3 by the way. South Mountain is his competitor, that's 
4
 true. So, so far, everything he says is true. 
5 Under the separate name of the Concerned 
6 Taxpayers of Utah, David Mast has attacked my character 
7 and integrity. Well, I put in the record a number of 
8 newspaper articles which lump Mr. Mast with the Concerned 
9 Taxpayers of Utah, he—they say he does fund the group's 
10 endeavors. 
11 He stands to make about $9 million from his 
12 Draper site subdivision, the group's efforts aren't 
13 likely to subside and Mast wouldn't have much trouble 
14 funding a mayoral campaign. 
15 Mast is quoted as saying, I feel I'm in a 
16 position that I could not only say something about an 
17 issue, but I could do something about it. I have money, 
18 I can put ads in papers, I can litigate it if I have to. 
19 And—and their Exhibits 8, 30 and 29 show that 
20 it is Mast attacking Overson, so Overson's self-defense 
21 was against things directly said by Mast. 
22 He goes on. He asks some questions and again 
23 this is the text of the press conference and at the end, 
24 he said, and this is the only thing I guess to even get 
25 close to thinking about defamation in the whole—in the 
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1 whole record, Isn't it a shame that a public official has 
2 to subject himself to threats, personal lawsuits, which 
3
 by the way there have been by the C.T.U., lies or 
4 character assassination. David Mast, or whatever you 
5 call yourself, I will not shrink from my public duties. 
6 The purchase of the South Mountain Golf Course is the 
7 right thing for golf in Salt Lake County. 
8 Now, all my arguments on summary judgment 
9 assume that's defamatory, but I think your Honor has to 
10 ask yourself, is that defamatory? The guy just says, 
11 Isn't it a shame that a person in my position has to put 
12 up with this and there's no question. 
13 Okay. This is the C.T.U. ad. He accuses Brent 
14 Overson of scams, misleading the public, meeting behind 
15 closed doors, refusing to provide documents under GRAMA 
16 requests. 
17 THE COURT: But don't-
is MR. GURMANKIN: That—that would g o — 
19 THE COURT: That goes to your other 
20 defenses of self-defense and consent and so forth? 
21 MR. GURMANKIN: Yeah. And—well, and 
22 the position of Mr. Overson that he found himself in, 
23 that's right. 
24 But—but more important, there is a letter we 
25 put in the record from Doug Short to Neal Gunnarson and 
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there's a newspaper article that says that—there's a 
newspaper article that says that David Mast took ads out 
on—on behalf of his organization, accuses Overson of— 
David Mast's ad—this is in the newspaper—accuses 
Overson of violating State law by meeting behind closed 
door. 
By the way, Judge Medley had dismissed those 
allegations with prejudice. And then it says that Mast 
is asking the Utah Attorney General's office to convene a 
grand jury, so these—these publications in the press 
before the—four days before the press conference talked 
about what Mast had done in attacking Mr. Overson. They-
-this doesn't controvert that. 
He doesn't need to depose Brent Overson to 
determine whether he said that he tried to get a grand 
jury convened or whether he accused Brent Overson of 
violating the open meetings act, doesn't need that; but 
the point is, Mast had directly attacked Overson. 
So, on this—on the case law on something not 
being capable of having a defamatory meaning, in the 
context of this, I think the Supreme Court of Utah, under 
the West case, that he cited and Judge Durham wrote a 
long opinion, would say— 
THE COURT: More—more footnote than 
I wanted to read in that opinion. 
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1 MR. GURMANKIN: And I. More 
2
 footnotes than I wanted to read, too; but I think under 
3
 the West case, it's pretty clear that this Court can rule 
4 as a matter of law, given that context and without regard 
5 to what was in Brent Overson's mind at the time, hey, 
6 there's no—there's no defamatory meaning. 
7 so, that's the first one that doesn't require 
8 Mr. Overson's deposition. 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Snuffer, do you want 
10 to deal with that one? 
11 MR. SNUFFER: I do. 
12 Well, could I stay here and— 
13 THE COURT: Oh, sure. 
14 MR. SNUFFER: —speak into this? 
15 I was trying to find where we mention it in our 
16 pleadings and I can't find it conveniently, but I know 
17 it's in there, because it's—it's of record, I read it 
18 again last night. 
19 One of the things that Mr. Overson did was to 
20 stand up—he called a press conference, he invited the 
21 television stations, the newspapers and the radio 
22 stations, unlike the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, that 
23 placed only a newspaper ad. 
24 He called this press conference. At the press 
25 conference, he says Mr. Mast is the alter ego of 
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Concerned Taxpayers, Concerned Taxpayers is the alter ego 
of David Mast, who are the same entity, Mast, Mast, Mast, 
Mast. 
Thereafter, as we mentioned in our pleadings, 
the news media started calling Mast through Concerned 
Taxpayers, Mast, through Concerned Taxpayers. 
MR. GURMANKIN: Your Honor, I'm going 
to—I shouldn't do this— 
THE COURT: No. Just a second. 
Mr. Gurmankin suggested in his argument that 
four days before, the newspapers had already made that 
connection; is that not the case? 
MR. SNUFFER: That's not the case. 
They had spoken with him and he has—he has says—he has 
said this repeatedly. In fact, I'm trying to find the 
quote— 
THE COURT: Okay. But in your—in 
your complaint, let's narrow it down to things in your 
complaint, you complained about a newspaper ad that's 
called "The Factsw? 
MR. SNUFFER: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that's available and 
on record. And then it says that your other complaint, 
in Paragraph 5, is that he called your client a liar and 
that the— 
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1 MR. SNUFFER: That was— 
2 THE COURT: —organization was 
3 involved in a ruse. 
4 MR. SNUFFER: Okay. And he talked— 
5 you talked about the statement that was made in—in—the 
6 22nd of August. Look at that on the 22nd of August, 
7 Exhibit 30, where Overson said, quote, "This is a 
8 competitor who is not happy with this transaction. This 
9 concerned Taxpayers of Utah is a ruse, it's strictly a 
10 front for David Mast." 
11 MR. GURMANKIN: I'm sorry, what is 
12 the name of that, your Honor? 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. GURMANKIN: Could I get the 
15 exhibit number of that? 
16 THE COURT: I think he said 30. 
17 MR. SNUFFER: 30. Exhibit 30. 
18 In any event, what Mr. Overson— 
19 THE COURT: And what—help me find 
20 the defamatory contents in light of the context that 
21 Justice Durham said we'd have to find. 
22 MR. SNUFFER: Okay. Look at Exhibit 
23 No. 33. Because I'm the only commissioner facing re-
24 election, I've been singled out by David Mast as a scape 
25 goat for South Mountain. It's not true. He was singled 
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out because he's the one that was meeting with South 
Mountain, he's the one that wanted this program to go 
through, he's the one that involved himself individually 
and he was singled out, not by Mr. Mast, but by the 
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah. 
Under the deceptive name of Concerned Taxpayers 
of Utah, David Mast has attacked my character and 
integrity. David Mast didn't, under the deceptive name 
of the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah do anything. 
There's an entire board, there's an entire 
body. Mr. Mast, on his own, can do nothing on behalf of 
the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah. 
THE COURT: Isn't this, though, the 
kind of expression of opinion that Justice Durham was 
talking about in that case? I mean, it's clear that— 
MR. SNUFFER: The—-
THE COURT: —the Court of Appeals 
held one way— 
MR. SNUFFER: Okay. 
THE COURT: —and the Supreme Court 
apparently found it was another. 
MR. SNUFFER: I think there's a 
distinction here and I think that the defense would lie 
if what Mr. Overson said was, Concerned Taxpayers of 
Utah, Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, Concerned Taxpayers of 
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Utah. 
What he did was change the dialogue. He left 
the entity responsible for making the statement and moved 
on to an individual and he attached the individual. 
You read this press statement and what he's 
saying in it is, among other things, David Mast commits 
lies, David Mast commits character assassination, David 
Mast is the alter ego of Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, 
David Mast, or whatever you call yourself—I mean, 
throughout it, he's attempting to focus not upon the 
statements or the entity making the statements in which I 
concede that's where this defense lies of it lies at all, 
but the dialogue's been changed, though. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is that any 
different, though, than the political debate that goes on 
every election year that Bob Dole or Bill Clinton have 
said whatever their subordinates have—have talked to the 
press about, they're not responsible? 
MR. SNUFFER: Certainly it is, but 
Mr. Mast is not a candidate for any office and Mr. Mast 
didn't engage in publication of the ad. The ad was 
published by a committee. 
THE COURT: He didn't—he didn't fund 
the ad? Mr. Gurmankin said that he paid for the ad. I 
believe he said he wasn't involved— 
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MR. SNUFFER: I believe that the— 
yeah. I believe that the way it operated was, the 
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah get donations from parties. 
Among others, Mr. Mast contributed— 
THE COURT: And then they decide how 
they're going to spend it. 
MR. SNUFFER: And they decide how to 
spend it. They decided to run the ad. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SNUFFER: He contributed to 
Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, Concerned Taxpayers of Utah 
paid for the ad. Were his contributions enough to pay 
for the entire ad? At this moment, I don't know. 
THE COURT: I ~ 
MR. SNUFFER: There were other 
people's money used— 
us, there was 
there 
made 
Utah. 
>, and 
by Mr. 
Call 
assassins, 
if 
THE 
never any 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: But—but : 
decision there by-
SNUFFER 
COURT: 
SNUFFER, 
this defense liesi 
Overson, vis-a-vis, 
. them liars, 
if you will, 
: Correct 
Okay. 
you're telling 
— 
. 
: And another party in 
, it lies < 
Concerned 
if you will, call 
as a statement 
Taxpayers of 
them character 
call them being less than candid, 
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if you will, fine; he didn't do that. What he did was 
say, Mr. Mast is a liar, Mr. Mast engages in alter ego to 
this (inaudible) Mr. Mast, Mr. Mast. 
And I'm saying to the extent that that defense 
lies, if it lies at all, it lies for another party who's 
not before the Court. I think that's—that's a 
distinction and it's a—and it's a significant one, one 
on which I think we're entitled under 56(f) to explore, 
which is all we're asking for at this moment. 
THE COURT: Okay. And Exhibit 33 is 
the press release then that— 
MR. SNUFFER: If— 
THE COURT: —that you're complaining 
about? 
MR. SNUFFER: Yes. But what happened 
was Mr. Overson called a press conference and read this 
at the press conference. There were representatives from 
the newspapers, from the television statements—stations 
and from the press and they asked questions and he 
answered them afterwards. 
This is what he said, okay, this is what he 
said in his prepared statement, but there was some 
dialogue that went on afterwards. 
THE COURT: Okay. And the purpose of 
your discovery would be to— 
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MR. SNUFFER: Flush out not only— 
THE COURT: —find out of he knew 
these things were not true? 
MR- SNUFFER: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. And— 
MR. SNUFFER: Oh, and he did know, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. And if you can 
establish that, that he knew these things were not true, 
do you think that's enough to get past— 
MR. SNUFFER: Absolutely. 
Absolutely. At that moment, it's a question of fact; in 
fact, at that moment, it's probably not going to be 
tried, but probably the parties are going to have a 
dialogue and see if we can resolve this, 
Mr. Overson has been less than candid with the 
public in what he said here and Mr. Overson is being very 
clever about the defenses that are being asserted at this 
moment, trying to continue to homogenize an individual 
with a corporate entity and it just won't wash. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Mr. Gurmankin, on number two, the absolute 
executive officer immunity. 
You—you can do it from the table, if you want, 
or you can do it at the podium, either way. 
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MR- GURMANKIN: I—it's a (inaudible) 
reaction, your Honor. 
This is a common law— 
THE COURT: I mean, if there was such 
an immunity, the Supreme Court wouldn't have issued the 
decision they did a couple weeks ago. 
MR. GURMANKIN: I'm not sure— 
THE COURT: Paula Jones and the 
president. 
MR. GURMANKIN: Oh. Well, I guess 
the first distinction that comes to mind is—well, no, 
your Honor, that's—that wasn't a defamation action. 
That wasn't a defamation action. 
This—and when we talk about defamation, we're 
talking about speech and the necessity of carrying out 
functions. I admit that there were some speech involved 
in the allegations by Paula Jones, but it was a different 
kind of speech. 
The common law recognize an absolute privilege 
for State and local executive officers who publish 
defamatory matter in the course of performing their 
executive duties. 
We cited a number of cases and some—including 
Fender vs. City of Oregon City,— 
THE COURT: So—and so if this 
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clearly had been at a council meeting, that would be one 
thing? But what about press conferences? 
MR. GURMANKIN: Yes, And in Fenderr 
at a press conference, the mayor got up and, at a press 
conference, talked about the prior city manager, prior 
city manager sued for defamation and the Court, the 
Federal Court said, under Oregon law, the executive 
officers have an absolute privilege to publish defamatory 
material in the course of performing their executive 
duties and held that it made no difference that it was 
done at a press conference because it was in the context 
of duties. 
The South Mountain development issue clearly 
was part of Mr. Overson's duties as a county 
commissioner; frankly, was carried out properly. Mr. 
Mast didn't like it, but he was defending himself. 
And one of the things he was doing, after that 
newspaper article, by the way, uncontrovertedly, after 
that newspaper article, was try to get people to 
understand that, hey, these things that they're—that 
Mast is saying about me aren't true. I'm not a criminal, 
you know, I—I—I didn't do anything wrong• I didn't 
have any secret meetings. 
And by the way, I'm going to get to that in a 
minute. All these statements are true. Truth is a 
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defense as a matter of law in this case, but as—as— 
THE COURT: Well, that's a matter of 
fact, though, I mean, that— 
MR. GURMANKIN: Well, I'm saying— 
THE COURT: If we get to that point, 
then we're obviously getting past summary judgment. 
MR. GURMANKIN: No. My—no, my point 
would be that no reasonable fact finder could find other 
than they're true, no matter what discovery is taken; but 
let me stay with this. 
THE COURT: Well— 
MR. GURMANKIN: Clearly, at this 
press conference, Mr. Overson had absolute immunity as an 
executive to make those statements, if they were 
defamatory. And that's absolute. 
Nothing he esti—I mean, nobody's going to deny 
Mr. Overson— 
THE COURT: So, Mr. Overson could get 
up at a press conference and talk about somebody's 
personal, private life, make things up and he has an 
absolute defense? 
MR. GURMANKIN: If he went beyond his 
duties in dealing with South—South Mountain, then 
perhaps not; but as long as he was talking in the 
confines of what he had done and what— 
47 
THE COURT: Well, let's say it's 
within the confines of South Mountain, he could get up 
and say, Mr. Mast is a so-and-so and does these things to 
kids and this to this and he would have absolute 
immunity? 
MR. GURMANKIN: The answer to that 
is, as long as it's in the course of performing his 
executive duties, yes. 
And that's similar to the speech and debate 
clause of the—of the Constitution. 
THE COURT: But the—doesn't the fact 
question come up when he crosses that line to—in terms 
of personal versus official duties? 
MR. GURMANKIN: I think that's a 
question of law for the Court on this record. I don't 
see how any reasonable fact finder could find other than 
under this record that he was dealing with South Mountain 
in defending himself against Mr. Mast's attack. 
And—and when someone says, Isn't it a shame 
that a public official has to put up with that, and it's 
in the context of having told people, hey, what was done 
here was kosher; he didn't—he didn't attack him on any 
kind of grounds outside of defending himself from the 
attacks that were all concerned with South Mountain. 
So, yeah, my position—and it's like the speech 
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1
 and debate clause of the Constitution, Somebody gets up 
2
 in Congress and says something horribly defamatory, it's 
3 not—it's not actionable. 
4 THE COURT: Well— 
5 MR. GURMANKIN: Now, thank goodness 
6
 (inaudible) 
7 THE COURT: —but in Congress, they 
8 can literally say anything. See, it doesn't have to be 
9 officially related, they can say anything— 
10 MR. GURMANKIN: That's right. 
11 THE COURT: —and there's an absolute 
12 defense there. 
13 MR. GURMANKIN: And—and here, I 
14 guess, your Honor, if your Honor says well, if there was 
15 something in the record that would allow you to make a 
16 determination that maybe there's a question of fact as to 
17 whether he was operating within his duties, we'd have a 
18 different question, but there's nothing in the record on 
19 that. 
20 You have the words and you have the—the reason 
21 I made this record so complete was 'cause you have all 
22 the context there is. 
23 THE COURT: Well, I guess I still 
24 have a question even looking at all those, was he 
25 defending himself as an individual or was he defending 
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1
 the policies that he had supported as an official, or a 
2
 little bit of both at that conference? 
3 MR. GURMANKIN: Well, I would say 
4
 that he—if he was doing both, it's still subject to that 
5 absolute immunity because keeping the public's confidence 
6 in the integrity of a public official as an individual is 
7 just as important. 
8 THE COURT: Maybe I just grew up at 
9 the wrong time. That sounds an awful lot like Watergate 
10 to me. I mean, where you—you say the defense of the 
11 individual is really the defense of the institution. 
12 MR. GURMANKIN: If he had committed 
13 burglary, that would be a different case. He got up in a 
14 press conference, after he'd been attacked, and said, 
15 isn't it a shame that somebody has to put up with this, 
16 right after he had gone through the facts about South 
17 Mountain. 
18 So, I don't see that it was an individual 
19 attack on Mr. Mast or it was an individual defense 
20 outside the context and that, I think all these cases are 
21 clear, the Court can determine that from the record as a 
22 matter of law. 
23 THE COURT: I—I mean I think it's—I 
24 think you're right in the sense that it's clear that the 
25 South Mountain controversy is what brought this to a 
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1
 head, but I—still lingering in the back is this 
2 question, Where do you cross the line between defending 
3 yourself and official duties? 
4 MR. GURMANKIN: And that—that is— 
5 THE COURT: And there is a line 
6 someplace. I guess I'm having trouble just defining it. 
7 MR. GURMANKIN: That's why 56(f) was 
8 written as it has, it was counsel's job to show the Court 
9 what kinds of questions are pertinent to that line and he 
10 failed completely to do that. 
11 And I'm not—I'm not trying to be disrespectful 
12 of your Honor in this; I mean, we have me up here who's 
13 made a record and taking my position and you're looking 
14 to see—you're testing the limits of that, and that's— 
15 that's legitimate. That's legitimate. 
16 And—but I think it's clearly on the record we 
17 have such that Mr. Overson was talking about South 
18 Mountain, so what kinds of questions to—put to Mr. 
19 Overson would create a controverted question of fact? 
20 And I—I fail to see that—that there could be 
21 one and certainly, it was not proposed as far as the 
22 56(f) affidavit. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. 
24 MR. GURMANKIN: All right. Truth. 
25 Good faith belief as to the truth and I think— 
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1
 THE COURT: Well, where are you—is 
2
 this still on the absolute— 
3
 MR. GURMANKIN: Oh. Yeah, under any 
4 one of these allegations of malice, common law malice 
5 requires that the plaintiff prove both falsity and some 
6 intent to harm. 
7 THE COURT: Uh huh. 
8 MR. GURMANKIN: Mr. Overson had a 
9 good faith belief as to the truth. He had been attacked 
1° by Mr. Mast, as reported in the paper, for not turning 
11
 over records, including his election disclosures, his 
12 election—his campaign finance disclosures. 
13 if your Honor will look at Exhibit 23 of the 
14 Ellis affidavit, you711 find a list of the thousands of 
15 documents that were disclosed in the document—in the 
16 GRAMA request of the C.T.U. He had indeed, 
17 uncontrovertedly, disclosed everything that needed to be 
18 and that's what led to Judge Medley's dismissal of that 
19 case only days before this case was filed. 
20 Mr. Mast accused the county of not intending to 
21 take title to the property. He put the document in the 
22 record that shows that the golf course was, if the deal 
23 went through, going, indeed, to become county property. 
24 There's nothing controverted in that, so that Mr. Overson 
25 obviously had a good faith belief in the truth of that, 
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the real estate purchase documents say that. And I think 
Judge Medley's dismissal lent credence to that. 
I'll cite the Court to the Gregory vs. Durham 
County case for that and I'd like—I'd like to read the 
Court, and these are decisions that the Court's made as a 
matter of law on records. 
I'd like to read from two cases I've cited that 
go to this question. One is Piper vs. Foe, this was a 
bitter campaign in Wyoming, and by the way, this was a 
campaign, too. Obviously, Mr. Mast, who—the competing 
developer was hurt by the papers, didn't like what was 
going on at South Mountain, he started attacking the 
commission and specifically, Mr. Overson. Mr. Overson 
defended himself. 
In this Piper case, in the midst of the 
campaign, one of the principals referred to the other one 
as having circulated false and insidious rumors. 
The Court said, Piper's statement about 
(inaudible) answers to his own articles in the midst of a 
heated campaign points up the fact that reply enjoys a 
qualified privilege and is recognized as a defense to an 
action for libel. 
After an attack on a defendant by a plaintiff, 
the defendant has the right to defend himself against 
plaintiff's charges, even if he defames the plaintiff in 
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doing so. 
case. 
is to try 
through. 
others. 
and then < 
and keep 
Those— 
jive-— 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: Okay. I— 
GURMANKIN: And dismissed 
COURT: 
these to one 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
What I'd like you 
the 
to do 
issue at a time, as we go 
GURMANKIN: Oh. 
COURT: —obviously relate to 
GURMANKIN: All right. 
COURT: And so that I can 
GURMANKIN: I'm sorry. 
focus 
THE COURT: —Mr. Snuffer a chance 
to—to deal with your arguments on each one. 
MR. GURMANKIN: I apologize, your 
Honor. I—I think I've said it. 
If there's a good faith belief in the truth, 
then malice cannot be shown as a matter of law, but the— 
the Gregory case I was going to get to said that, and I 
think the record is clear, as I've made it in these 
documents and nothing that he says is going to— 
THE COURT: But—but I would suggest 
that what Mr. Snuffer indicated was that your client knew 
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1
 that Mast and C.T.U. were not synonymous and his 
2 discovery would provide evidence of that and so that then 
3
 becomes a factual question. 
4 MR. GURMANKIN: Can we have a moment? 
5 can we have a moment to talk about that, if that's the 
6 issue? 
7 First of all, saying somebody is an alter ego 
8 or is synonymous is not defamatory. If Mr. Flynn—or 
9 I'll take my—or if I say to Mr. Flynn, Mr. Flynn, you 
10 know that little corporation you had set up? That's a 
11 ruse. Yeah, it's just you, you're out there. That's not 
12 defamatory. 
13 Not only that, if your Honor will look at 
14 Exhibit 6, 7 and I don't have the number, but this is the 
15 document request that was made, the GRAMA request, 
16 Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, care of David K. Mast, 
17 signed by David K. Mast. 
18 The letter to the—to Brent Overson with an 
19 attached article, accusing him of all kinds of nasty 
20 things, sending copies to Horiuchi, Callahan and Doug 
21 Short— 
22 THE COURT: Yes, but I can see, Mr. 
23 Gurmankin, that there are a nuiaber of things that you're 
24 putting forth that would support your client's view that 
25 they were the same; but whether they are or whether 
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they're not, or whether your client believed it or not 
becomes a factual question, doesn't it? 
MR. GURMANKIN: No—no, your Honor, 
if—if he had a good faith belief. A good faith belief— 
basis for believing it—assuming it was defamatory and I-
-I can't believe that's— 
THE COURT: But they haven't—they 
haven't asked him that question yet, and aren't they 
entitled to say, Did you have a good faith belief? Did 
you know about these other things? Isn't that what the 
purpose of the deposition is, is to see what those facts 
are? 
MR. GURMANKIN: If the question were 
whether those things were true, then I think that could 
be explored; but when the question is whether a person 
has a good faith basis for believing it and that's the 
critical question, then the uncontroverted record here 
shows that he does. 
THE COURT: But do we have anything 
that says that he did believe it? 
MR. GURMANKIN: Well, we have the 
fact that he said it and we have the fact that there was 
a good faith basis for it, because everything that he 
said was true. As a matter of law, and I'll come back 
again to their failure to controvert it; he didn't 
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controvert one fact that he said, and he could have. 
And— 
THE COURT: I'll— 
MR. GURMANKIN: And also the fact 
that just calling that a ruse. There's only one 
statement here, your Honor, I believe that really raises 
a question whether it's defamatory and that's the liar 
question; How long do you have to put up with liars? 
That's the only question that—that even gets close and 
for a whole bunch of reasons, including the West Context 
Doctrine, not being capable of defamatory meaning, I 
think as a matter of law that's not; we don't get into 
the root question here. 
Because if I told my daughter today, hey, 
daughter, you know, that little organization you set up 
is just a front for you, even assuming I didn't have some 
privilege as a parent, it's not defamatory. 
I'll go on to the next one after Mr. Snuffer's 
had a turn to respond. 
THE 
MR. 
respond to then? 
THE 
executive officer. 
MR. 
COURT: Mr. Snuffer? 
SNUFFER: So, which one am I to 
COURT: It would be the absolute 
SNUFFER: This didn't happen in a 
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meeting of the county commission, this didn't happen—Mr. 
Brent Overson could discharge his responsibilities as a 
county commissioner without ever having done what he did. 
Furthermore, I think it very clear that when he 
turned around and published his publication, he wanted to 
make it clear he was not acting as a county commissioner. 
"This ad authorized and paid for by the Overson election 
committee to clearly state the facts. This ad was not 
paid for by taxpayer dollars." 
He wasn't acting as a county commissioner. He 
was acting as Brent Overson personally. I'm the only 
commissioner facing re-election, I've been singled out by 
David Mast, my character, I, I, my, I will not. This is 
Mr. Overson acting in his individual capacity. 
If there were such a thing as an immunity based 
upon something analogous to the speech and debate clause, 
this wasn't speech and debate. The other county 
commissioners and Brent Overson were not debating whether 
or not to agree, vote, disapprove or not approve 
something. This was not Mr. Overson acting in his 
official capacity. 
And—and the allegations that he enjoys 
immunity, if they are accurate at all, would require 
something more than the fact that he holds an office at 
the moment that he makes a statement. That would make 
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1
 everyone who holds an office as executive in nature, 
2
 immune from whatever they say. 
3 THE COURT: But isn't this part of 
4 participating in a public debate about the golf course? 
5 I mean, the debate is more than just what goes on in 
6 chambers, isn't it? I mean, part of it is each side 
7 trying to lay out their view so that the public can get 
8 involved and mobilized on one side or the other. 
9 MR. SNUFFER: Okay. But when do you 
10 go too far and when—when is the process itself— 
11 THE COURT: That's what I was asking 
12 Mr. Gurmankin, to help me draw that line. 
13 MR. SNUFFER: Right. I think it 
14 clear that Mr. Overson felt some personal need to engage 
15 personally in the dialogue and not do it at taxpayer 
16 expense because his ad makes it clear that he's not 
17 spending taxpayer money. 
18 If he's engaging in that dialogue, which he's 
19 entitled to do and he wants to use his own voice and—and 
20 not—if it—if it was him in his capacity as an 
21 executive, why didn't this come out on county commission 
22 letterhead? Why wasn't it approved by the county 
23 commission? 
24 This was just him as an individual shooting his 
25 mouth off. And that's fine, too, if he confines it to 
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the players in the—in the battle front. He didn't. He 
reached out, for some personal reason, we believe when we 
get into discovery, what we're going to find out is that 
Mr. Overson was rather chummy with the South Mountain 
people and they got him worked up. 
When this dialogue began— 
THE COURT: Assuming even that's 
true,— 
MR. SNUFFER: Well, it—then that's 
why he wanted Mr. Mast viewed as the alter ego of 
Concerned Taxpayers and as a liar. That's why he wanted 
that, to discredit him. 
want to make— 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: Okay. And— 
SNUFFER: The other point that I 
COURT: — I guess this relates 
back to the first argument, though; how—how does a 
politician calling somebody a liar rise to the level of 
defamatory? 
with immunity? 
Justice Durham 
MR. 
I think 
THE 
SNUFFER: Politicians can do that 
it's a question— 
COURT: No. But I mean, again, 
talks about the context. In the course of 
a political discussion— 
MR. SNUFFER: Okay. 
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politician chooses 
camp a liar,— 
that? 
THE COURT: — a politician, any 
to call somebody in their opposite 
MR. SNUFFER: I— 
THE COURT: —who's going to believe 
MR. SNUFFER: I think that if Mr. 
Overson wants to called the Concerned Taxpayers the liar, 
that's okay; but you don't reach out to some individual 
personally and attack him personally and gratuitously. 
That's what he did here. 
And when it comes to that, I think we're 
entitled to confront him and cross-examine him and to 
show that it was ill-motivated. 
The other matter, and I need to clarify this 
because I haven't mentioned it up to this point and it's 
come up repeatedly in the statements of—of Mr. 
Gurmankin. 
The fact is that the—the reason that Judge 
Medley dismissed the other lawsuit is because it was 
moot. The county did not buy that—that golf course. 
The Concerned Taxpayers of Utah succeeded. There were 
seven plus million dollars of taxpayer money saved and as 
a result of the fact that the county didn't purchase the 
golf course, Judge Medley dismissed the case because it 
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came moot, without any prejudice to the Concerned 
Taxpayers' ability to step back in if there is something 
at a later date, attempts to revive the purchase by the 
county of the golf course. They didn't purchase that 
golf course. It didn't happen. And—and statements 
otherwise and suggestions otherwise, just aren't true. 
I forget what the other matters were, I— 
THE COURT: I—I distracted you from 
that. The— 
MR. SNUFFER: I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: —absolute executive 
officer immunity. 
So, are—are you willing to concede that if he 
was functioning in his official capacity, he would be 
protected? 
MR. SNUFFER: I think if he was 
acting in his official capacity, then the defense would 
lie and you would have to then examine carefully what it 
was he said. I don't think the defense— 
THE COURT: Or what? I mean, it's 
either absolute or it isn't. 
MR. SNUFFER: Well, I don't—I don't 
think the executive can say—well, if the county 
commission is in the heat of a debate and getting to vote 
on a motion and—and as they get a little enthusiastic 
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about statements that are made, I think it would be tough 
to hold them accountable in those circumstances, unless 
completely gratuitous comments, unrelated to the 
substance of the debate, intentionally harmful to 
someone. 
I mean, there again, what you're getting is, 
even in that context, the possibility of the executive 
officer stepping outside of his role and engaging in a 
personal dialogue. Clearly, that's what Mr. Overson did 
here. 
I don't—I think he~ 
THE COURT: But—but you're agreeing 
with Mr. Gurmankin to the extent that if it was in his 
capacity, there's an absolute immunity or is that an 
inaccurate statement of the law? 
MR. SNUFFER: No, I—no. I think 
that goes too far on the law, too. What I'm arguing is, 
assuming that his argument has some validity, then it 
still falls under the facts of this case; but I'm not 
sure that argument has any validity. 
There isn't any Utah authority on that that I— 
that I saw in the memorandum or (inaudible) stated from 
other sources I—I took some question to. I—I don't 
know that it exists, but assuming it exists and I'm 
conceding that for purposes of argument and I probably 
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should not, but I concede that even beyond that, it 
doesn't apply to the facts of this case. 
And Mr. Overson himself made it very clear when 
he placed a subsequent ad and said, this is not a 
taxpayer ad, this is not taxpayer funded. It's me. And 
why would he do that if he were Mr. 
Overson/slash/executive/slash/acting within the scope? 
He wouldn't. He didn't. 
And I think that the argument on the facts fail 
as a consequence. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SNUFFER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Gurmankin? There is an absolute privilege 
because it was consented to? 
MR. GURMANKIN: Yeah. Can I just go 
back to this previous argument and say one thing? 
THE COURT: You—you'll run out of 
the time to get the other seven in; you've got 20 minutes 
left. 
MR. GURMANKIN: I'll do it—I'll do 
it quickly. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GURMANKIN: Mr. Snuffer just 
said, if he wants to call the Concerned Taxpayers a liar, 
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1
 that's okay, Concerned Taxpayers. The question here i s — 
2
 is what is he doing, is he acting in his capacity or is 
3 he not. 
4 If he's acting in that capacity and it's okay 
5 to call the Concerned Taxpayers a liar, then it's okay to 
6 call anybody a liar. 
7 Besides—and by the way, this ad, the facts, is 
8 not defamatory, was paid for, was signed by a number of 
9 people. The reason they didn't use—they didn't have the 
10 state, or the County pay for it was that they didn't want 
11 to use taxpayer dollars. I don't think that's a reason 
12 to hold that he wasn't acting in his official capacity 
13 when he had a press conference days before this to defend 
14 himself. 
15 Okay. Consent. Absolute privilege. Cited a 
16 couple of cases on it. Don't need to talk too long about 
17 it. The Royer case, which we cited in our brief, Royer 
18 vs. Seinbera dealt with a discharged plaintiff who 
19 publicly challenged his former employer to prove the 
20 truth of the charges leading to his dismissal. The 
21 employer did it and then he got sued for def—he sued the 
22 employer for defamation. 
23 He asked for it. So did Mr. Mast. Mr. Mast, 
24 if you'll read the documents in the record that preceded 
25 the press conference, kept writing letters, asking for 
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1 documents, wanted the grand jury, he asked them for a 
2 response. 
3 And my position is that as a matter of law, it 
4 was an invited response and so even though— 
5 THE COURT: An implied asking or is 
6 there a specific, explicit asking for a response? 
7 MR. GURMANKIN: May I have a minute 
with— 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. GURMANKIN: In the February 26th, 
1996, letter, and this is just one example, Mast signs a 
letter, it's on C.T.U. letterhead, "We would like to know 
what the county's intent is for South Mountain and its 
golf course property. Does the county intend on dealing 
15 I with them privately or in the open? Does the county 
intend for the public to competitively bid or just give 
the work back to South Mountain for what they did, 
absorbing the price at the expense of the Utah taxpayer." 
And I would say that the exhibits which contain 
the—the statements by Mr. Mast are replete with 
invitations to respond. 
Here we go. Exhibit 8, a 1995 Deseret News 
article. 
THE COURT: 8 is October 28th of '96? 
MR. GURMANKIN: No—-yeah. October 
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10 
11 
-I 28th, 1996. I'm sorry. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. So, this is after 
3 I the press conference? 
4 MR. GURMANKIN: Yeah. But it's an 
5 example of what he—the—the way—the things that Mast 
6 asked for. He was talking about how he's a law student 
7 now and et cetera. He continued—and at the bottom of 
g the first page and goes on to the second, he continues to 
a rely on the legal system, because it is the only way to 
know the whole story. 
In the August 22nd, 1996, ad, he accuses 
12 Overson of violating State law by meeting behind closed 
13 
15 
16 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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25 
doors, fires a volley of other accusations at Overson, 
14 including the claim that the county isn't buying the 
land. Asked the Attorney General to convene a grand 
jury. 
17 I And I'll—I'll just go with it this way, your 
Honor. I'll say it's an implied consent, and that as a 
matter of law and this record, he consented to Mr. 
Overson asking these questions and that consent means 
that even if there—under the Royer case, even if there 
were a defamatory statement—and you will excuse me if I 
sit down, your Honor? 
THE COURT: That's fine. 
MR. GURMANKIN: That it is, as a 
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1 matter of law, there is no claim, 
2 By the way, on March 4th, 1996—I knew I'd find 
3 it—Mast sent a letter to each county commissioner and 
4 the County Attorney calling upon Overson to schedule a 
5 public meeting and have public comment on the issue 
6 stating, That way at least, it will not appear as though 
7 you have something to hide* 
g I take that as an indication—and—and Overson 
9 let it simmer, then comes the— 
THE COURT: However, an official 
public meeting is certainly different than a press 
12 I conference. When they—they both lay things out in 
13 public but one has the forum of a public meeting at 
.|4 least. 
15 MR. GURMANKIN: Uh huh. I--I 
16 | understand what your Honor is saying, what—but the point 
17 I here is, if there is an invitation and then something is 
done defamatory, I assume at the public meeting, you 
wouldn't have said it was defamatory, then it's been 
invited. In any event, that's—that's the position on 
that point. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Snuffer? 
MR. SNUFFER: Yes. On that point, 
the case that he cites, the Royer case that he focused on 
18 
19 
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25 in the memorandum says, the plaintiff publicly challenged 
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-I his former employer to, quote, "prove the truth of the 
2 charges leading to his dismissal." The Court held that 
3 this challenge, quote, "constituted nothing less than a 
4 request for the publication of the evidence upon which 
5 the employer based the charges", unquote. 
6 I mean, that's not what happened here and the 
7 facts of Royer uniquely limit its applicability. 
8 The March 4th, '96 letter for a public hearing 
9 is far different than what happened at the press 
10 conference that Mr. Overson held, in which 
^ representatives of the Concerned Taxpayers, including Mr. 
12 Christiansen, who's here, and got up and asked if he 
13 could ask a question of Mr. Overson on behalf of the 
14 Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, but Mr. Overson said, no, 
you can't, this is my press conference, this is for the 
press only, I'm not going to answer you people's 
17 I questions. 
And that's not the kind of public hearing that 
the March 4th, '96 letter was inviting at which it would 
have a formal get-together of a quorum of the county 
commission and evidence presented on both sides of the 
issue. 
That's vastly different than the press 
conference that we're talking about here. We don't have 
a consent to—a challenge for, and a request for 
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-I publication of evidence; and furthermore, even if the 
2 challenge was made within the—the context of everything 
3 that they urged on the Court, it was made by the entity 
4 and not by the individual and a single act gratuitously 
5 affecting individual is a different matter and involves 
6 different principles, 
7 You can't say that Jones invited me to—to tell 
8 the truth, so now I'm going to attack Smith. That's not 
g the way the challenge would work, if you were to find in 
this case—which is really a stretch—that there was such 
a challenge. 
The—the cite to the Royer case itself 
distinguishes it factually from the facts of this case, 
14 I your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gurmankin, the fourth 
area is that the statements were opinion and protected by 
the Utah Constitution. 
MR. GURMANKIN: I'll—I'll rest on 
what we've written. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GURMANKIN: I think your Honor 
has expressed that your Honor understands it. The West 
case, I think clearly, in the context again, they're 
saying there was four standards on whether it's an 
opinion and I think they're met in this case. So, I'll 
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submit that without—I won't—I will submit it, 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Mr. Snuffer? 
your 
MR. SNUFFER: Well, again, I—I think 
that if you consider the record that's before you—I'm 
going to get some scotch tape, here's a little notice to 
the attorneys up here, it's torn and (inaudible)—I think 
that if—if you look at the record that is before you, 
your Honor, that it's clear that what—what Mr. Overson 
did on that day is to go off half-cocked, attacking an 
individual when if—if he wanted to engage in the kind of 
dialogue that he says he was attempting to engage in, he 
had no reason to—he wanted to change the dialogue, he 
wanted to come to that meeting on that day and alter the 
focus, he wanted to get into personalities and he wanted 
to attack Mr. Mast individually and he wanted to do that 
because of private meetings he'd had with the competing 
developers. ~ That's what he wanted to do. 
Take it out of the context of the Concerned 
Taxpayers of Utah and turn it into a personality contest 
and involve Mr. Mast and to say that he was a liar and to 
attack him and he did that. 
And what we're saying now is, given those facts 
which are of record in the—in the documents that are 
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1 before you, without the benefit of an answer having been 
2 filed, with no discovery having been cooperated in by the 
3 defendant up to this moment, should this case be 
4 dismissed on the merits of summary judgment, or should we 
5 take one step back, as I was talking to you earlier, 
6 we're—we're about out of the time that you had 
7 scheduled, and close the pleadings, allow for some 
a discovery and fix these issues before you, because there 
q are questions of moment raised in the materials that are 
before the Court. 
And it seems singularly hasty, unwise and 
imprudent to—to take this case at this moment and treat 
where we are as either a motion to dismiss or a summary 
judgment motion without affording the plaintiff, who's 
been called a liar in front of newspapers, television, 
radio announcers, who have in turn repeated that 
17 publication throughout this community, without giving him 
18 
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an opportunity to engage in any discovery whatsoever. 
I think that would be imprudent and unwise and 
that is after all, the moment we are at here today and 
that—that ought to be the—the question we return to 
again. 
I'm happy to answer any questions the Court 
has, but I—I do think the matter's been adequately 
briefed. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 MR. SNUFFER: Thank you. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. 
4 Mr. Gurmankin, finally, the qualified privilege 
of self defense. 
6 I MR. GURMANKIN: Last point and I want 
7 to just lump the self defense and the protecting 
o legitimate interest of the defendant together— 
g THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GURMANKIN: —and just read you 
from some cases. Right on point, Piper vs. Beaur it's 
Tab 26 in—in our book, we have volumes for you. An 
13 attack answering accusations against the county 
14 
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treasurer, the Court says, Piper's statements in the 
midst of a heated campaign points out the fact that reply 
enjoys a qualified privilege and is recognized as a 
defense to an action for libel. 
After an attack on a defendant by a plaintiff, 
defendant has the right to defend himself against 
plaintiff's charges, even if he defames the plaintiff in 
21 doing so, 
Gregory vs. Porn County. this is No. 20 in your 
book, your Honor. A teacher sued a school superintendent 
for defaming her and said that what he said was a lie. 
The Court said the claim will be denied. Togerson's 
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-I article, that was the plaintiff's article, infringed 
2 legally cognizable interest of Yeager—I substitute 
3 Overson for Yeager—which he had a qualified privilege 
4 under law to protect. 
5 He also enjoyed a personal privilege of self 
6 defense. His statements at the meeting of teacher 
7 representatives and in his letter were reasonably limited 
o to defense of his interest, rather this is a matter of 
g law, and the person to whom the statements were addressed 
had sufficient legitimate interest in their contents to 
preclude the defendant's waiver of the privilege to 
12 excessive publication. 
13 
14 
15 
THE COURT: Okay. If it's a personal 
privilege of self defense, doesn't that take it outside 
of the official scope then? 
16 I MR. GURMANKIN: I—they're 
17 alternative grounds, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to 
make sure that I'm clear, so it's one or the other then. 
MR. GURMANKIN: Okay. Absolutely, 
yes. 
I THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GURMANKIN: No waiver through 
malice. Since Yeager was clearly acting in good faith to 
protect his interests and the Fran, it's the Yellow Cab, 
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-I People's Cab case from the Federal Court in Pittsburgh, 
2 where the Court said all those statements wherein 
3 Armstrong either denies the accusations from the previous 
4 night's news or where he gives his impressions of Fran's 
5 previous statements—by the way, he basically called Fran 
6 a liar—are not capable of defamatory meaning. 
7 Plaintiff, Fran, had seriously accused Yellow 
o Cab of much wrongdoing on a previous show, Armstrong was 
g entitled to express his impression of Fran's statements. 
Your Honor, I'll say this man and, you know, 
they can talk all they want about whether the C.T.U. is 
one party and Mast is another party, I invite you to look 
at the record and see whether anybody ever spoke for 
C.T.U. but Mast and what the press thought of whether 
Mast was separate from the C.T.U. 
He called my guy a felon and the law is for a — 
17 I the Court uses all—the Courts use these rules, if you 
start a fight in the newspaper, if you start a public 
fight and you call somebody a nasty name, you can't call 
anybody anything much nastier than going and trying—than 
publicly announcing—publicly announcing in your name 
that you've asked for a criminal investigation. 
Don't come crying to the Court if somebody says 
that—that you lied or attacks you back. That's the 
doctrine, that's what I submit and there is not a 
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10 
1 question, not only has Mr. Snuffer failed in—in meeting 
2 the rules and there's a reason for those rules and we've 
3 been dealing with that today, there—there is not a 
4 question but that on this record, not only was it not 
5 defamatory, but all he was doing was protecting himself. 
g He focused on—he didn't focus on Mast's 
7 personal life or anything, he was dealing with South 
8 Mountain and he responded. So Mast starts a big fight, 
g acts like a big man, says he's the lawsuit man, says I 
have plenty of money, attacks my client in the press, 
^ attacks him by going to the County Attorney and trying to 
23 
24 
25 
get a criminal charge against him and now he comes crying 
to you and the law doesn't provide a remedy, as a matter 
of law. 
12 
13 
14 
15 I Thank you. 
16 , THE COURT: Mr. Snuffer? 
17 I MR. SNUFFER: Again, that argument 
18 . confuses two separate entities, two separate individuals 
1Q and it attempts to gloss over that distinction which is 
20 I substantive and which is real. 
21 I Returning to their memorandum on this very 
2p point and I'm reading from his memorandum, Mast must show 
that Overson published the words with, quote, "an 
improper motive such as a desire to do harm or that he 
did not honestly believe the statements to be true." 
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That's what the memorandum says and I don't dispute that. 
The Mast affidavit- I'll need to take the 
deposition of Mr. Overson in order to oppose his 
allegations that the statements he made were in self 
defense without the transcript, video or audio tapes. I 
can't take the deposition of Mr. Overson and fully oppose 
the claim he makes that the statements were made in self 
defense. 
The statements were not self defense but rather 
than attack on me intended to disparage and defame me and 
my reputation. This clearly is squarely within the scope 
of 56(f). It's fact sensitive. What was Overson's 
motive? What was Overson's belief? How do we weigh and 
test that without subjecting him to a deposition in which 
I get an opportunity to ask him about that motive, to ask 
him about that belief and to confront him with the 
history that will make it difficult, if not impossible, 
for him to maintain that he had a proper motive and that 
he had an honest belief. 
He dealt with the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah 
and solicited them to participate in other litigation. 
If he denies that, we have Mr. Dryer, his attorney in 
that other matter, who can corroborate that he knew about 
that. 
In any event, the argument is flawed because it 
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attempts to homogenize an individual with an entity. 
Assuming everything that Mr. Gurmankin says is true, it 
goes only to comments and a license to make comments as 
to the entity, Concerned Taxpayers of Utah, and it 
doesn't give him a license to say what he will about Mr. 
Mast, individually, as he did in the press conference. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Gurmankin, I asked 
Mr. Snuffer at the beginning and I ought to give you a 
chance to talk about that as well, whether it's 
appropriate to translate these into a motion to dismiss 
if 56(f) has been met. 
MR. GURMANKIN: I'm sorry, your 
Honor. I'm not sure I understand the—the question. If 
56(f) has been met? 
THE COURT: If the motion for summary 
judgment, if they're entitled to do— 
MR. GURMANKIN: Oh. 
THE COURT: —discovery before I rule 
on the motions for summary judgment, some of these 
arguments, at least to me, appear to be that whatever 
facts they discover, the question is whether they would 
be able to meet your motions. 
Should I consider those as motions to dismiss 
within summary judgment motions? 
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j MR. GURMANKIN: Your Honor, I'm—I'm 
2 hesitant to convert them because I wanted to make a 
3 record, I think for some of those, for you to hold that 
4 as a matter of law, you need to consider the record 
5 that's been made and therefore, you wouldn't just be 
g looking at the four corners of their complaint. 
So— 
8 I THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GURMANKIN: —what I will do is 
add an alternative 12(b)(6) motion, but I'll leave on 
file the—the Rule 56 motion and my other positions. 
12 I THE COURT: Okay. 
13 , MR. GURMANKIN: Is that~I hope I've 
14 I answered your question. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MR. GURMANKIN: Thank you, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. And gentlemen, I'm 
going to take it under advisement. I— 
MR. SNUFFER: Do you have— 
THE COURT: —sometimes falsely 
suggest to counsel I'll have something quickly; this one 
is going to take—take some reading and some work, but I 
will try and be as timely as I can. 
MR. SNUFFER: Your Honor, in the 
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-j meantime, do you want to order the parties to cooperate 
2 in discovery or are we going to—I mean# if I do anything 
3 else, I'm going to get a motion for a protective order, 
4 we're not going to get discovery. 
5 THE COURT: I'm not going to order 
6 anybody to do anything until I get this resolved. 
7 MR. SNUFFER: Okay. 
THE COURT: I mean, if you want to 
a I file motions to compel and those kinds of things, 
certainly you can do that and preserve your positions, 
but I#m not going to rule on'those things until I resolve 
this. 
I think there are enough questions in this that 
I need to take a—a hard serious look at this. This is 
not something that I have already decided and will take a 
matter of dashing something out. I'm going to have to 
17 I give this some consideration. 
18 I MR. SNUFFER: Okay. 
1Q THE COURT: Okay. 
2 0 I MR. GURMANKIN: Thank you, your 
21 I flonor. 
22 THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. GURMANKIN: I also want to thank 
you for allowing my daughter to— 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm just—I'm 
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•j amazed at how patient she is to sit for two hours of oral 
2 argument and be sane still. 
g MR. GURMANKIN: I guess she gets a 
4 lot of practice at home. 
_ THE COURT: She's always welcome to 
g I come back. 
_ MR. GURMANKIN: Thank you, your 
8 i Honor. 
g I MR. SNUFFER: Thank you. 
1Q THE COURT: Thank you. 
.... (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
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•, TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 I STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
3 I COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
4 I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
g That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court 
g Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I 
received an electronically recorded videotape of the 
7 I within matter and under his supervision have transcribed 
the same into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, 
3 numbered from 1 to 81, inclusive, to the best of my 
ability constitute a full, true and correct 
g transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 27th day of 
September, 1997. 
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 / 
Transcriber /f 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day 
of September, 1997. 
\ \c^f <t& o? "^.-notary Public 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of 
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically 
recorded videotape of the within matter and caused the 
same to be transcribed into typewriting, and that the 
foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 81, inclusive, to the 
best of my knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 29th day of 
September, 1997. 
^ : ; J^y u •.'*.- Notary Public 
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ADDENDUM 2 
•'tub o - „ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID K. MAST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRENT OVERSON, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO.960907782 
Plaintiff, David K. Mast, through counsel, filed his complaint 
on November 6, 1996. Defendant, Brent Overson, responded and filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 27, 1997. Oral argument 
was held before the Court on June 9, 1997. The issue before the 
court is whether statements made by the defendant in two newspaper 
articles and a full-page advertisement are defamatory to the 
plaintiff. 
FACTUAL SETTING 
This case arises out of Salt Lake County's proposed purchase 
of South Mountain Golf Course. The plaintiff, David Mast, who is 
a real estate developer and the president of "Concerned Taxpayers 
of Utah," opposed this acquisition. A heated debate ensued with 
the plaintiff sending several letters to the Salt Lake County 
MAST V. OVERSON PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Commiss ioners , and wi th t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e p u r c h a s e 
b e i n g q u o t e d i n s e v e r a l l o c a l newspaper a r t i c l e s . This c r i t i c i s m 
c u l m i n a t e d wi th the Concerned Taxpayers of Utah p l a c i n g a f u l l - p a g e 
a d v e r t i s e m e n t i n a l o c a l newspaper , e n t i t l e d , " S . L . COUNTY 
COMMISSIONER, BRENT OVERSON MISLEADS THE PUBLIC AND CONTINUES TO 
VIOLATE STATE LAW!" The d e f e n d a n t ' s r e a c t i o n s t o t he a d v e r t i s e m e n t 
were r e p o r t e d and quoted i n two s e p a r a t e l o c a l newspaper a r t i c l e s . 
C l o s e l y f o l l o w i n g t h e s e a r t i c l e s , a f u l l - p a g e a d v e r t i s e m e n t , p a i d 
by t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s r e - e l e c t i o n commit tee and c o - s i g n e d by t h e 
d e f e n d a n t and o t h e r s , was p u b l i s h e d i n a l o c a l newspape r . The 
s t a t e m e n t s a l l e g e d to be de fama to ry t o t h e p l a i n t i f f a r e c o n t a i n e d 
w i t h i n t h e s e t h r e e p u b l i c a t i o n s . 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Summary judgment i s a p p r o p r i a t e when t h e r e a r e no g e n u i n e 
i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o 
j udgmen t a s a m a t t e r of law, U tah R . C i v . P . 5 6 ( c ) . 
DEFAMATION 
The Utah Supreme Cour t , i n Cox v . Ha t ch , 761 P .2d 556 (Utah 
1988) , r e c o g n i z e d t h a t a de f ama t ion a c t i o n n e c e s s a r i l y b e g i n s w i t h 
a t h r e s h o l d f i n d i n g t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t h a s a de famato ry m e a n i n g . 
S t a t i n g , " [ w ] h e t h e r t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of an a l l e g e d d e f a m a t o r y 
s t a t e m e n t . . . i s c apab l e of c o n v e y i n g a de f ama to ry message i s 
i n i t i a l l y a q u e s t i o n of l a w , " t h e c o u r t r e a s o n e d t h a t , " [ o ] n l y i f 
MAST V. OVERSON PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
a court first determines that a publication might be considered 
defamatory by a reasonable person is there a fact issue for the 
trier of fact." Id. at 561. Thus, this Court must first evaluate 
the statements at issue for a defamatory message. 
"Under Utah law, a statement is defamatory if it impeaches an 
individual's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation and thereby 
exposes the individual to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." 
West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994) . In 
defining a defamatory statement, the Utah Supreme Court explained 
that, "the guiding principle is one statement's tendency to injure 
a reputation in the eyes of its audience." Id-
Evaluating the effect of the statements upon the reputation of 
the plaintiff requires a contextual viewing of the statements.1 The 
plaintiff, as early as April 16, 1996, began publicly criticizing 
Salt Lake County's interest in purchasing the South Mountain Golf 
Course. The plaintiff's criticisms were reported in at least four 
newspaper articles prior to the August 22, 1996, full-page 
advertisement. Then, on August 22, 1996, Concerned Taxpayers of 
Utah, of which the plaintiff is the president, placed a full-page 
newspaper advertisement targeting the defendant, again criticizing 
lTIA court simply cannot determine whether a statement is 
capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning by viewing individual 
words in isolation; rather it must carefully examine the context in 
which the statement was made, giving the words their most common 
and accepted meaning." West, 872 P.2d at 1008. 
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the County regarding the proposed purchase of South Mountain Golf 
Course. The alleged defamatory statements were published in 
response to this full-page advertisement. 
Though this Court recognizes that the two articles and the 
full-page advertisement co-signed by the defendant criticize the 
plaintiff, this Court does not believe that these statements would 
injure the plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of the audience. The 
statements of both parties revolved around Salt Lake County's 
purchase of South Mountain Golf Course. The statements by the 
defendant were reported in the same medium as the initial 
criticisms by the plaintiff. The statements found in the two 
newspaper articles were in direct response to the plaintiff's full-
page advertisement. An audience would easily recognize the 
responsive nature and tone of the statements. Furthermore, readers 
are likely to consider the political arena of the statements, and 
the accompanying editorial nature. 
Debate occurring in the political arena is understood to be 
peculiar. Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Whitney 
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-376 (1927), declared: 
Those who won our independence believed . . . that public 
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be 
a fundamental principle of the American government. They 
recognized the risks to which all human institutions are 
subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured 
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; 
that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and 
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imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression 
breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that 
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss 
freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and 
that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. 
Believeing in the power of reason as applied through 
public discussion, they eschwed silence coerced by law— 
the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the 
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they 
amended the Constitution so that free speech and asembly 
should be guaranteed. 
The Supreme Court endorsed this viewpoint in Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957): "[t]he protection given speech 
and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas 
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people." Likewise, in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 270 (1964), the "profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open" was noted. And lastly, the Supreme Court 
has stated, "[w]hatever differences may exist about interpretations 
of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement 
that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs." Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 
214, 218 (1966). 
Newspaper readers recognize that the political arena is a 
fertile source of "pointed, harsh, and even defamatory criticism." 
West, 872 P.2d at 1020. The statements of the defendant were a 
piece of a puzzle framed by politics, public spending, and an 
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upcoming election. Readers would have known and understood this, 
and weighed the statements accordingly. Thus, even though the 
criticism may have been harsh or even false, "it cannot be said 
that it exposed [the plaintiff] to public hatred, contempt, or 
ridicule." Id. at 1011. 
Furthermore, those who voluntarily enter the political arena 
have been warned by the Utah Supreme Court that they should, 
"expect to be jostled and bumped in a way that a private person 
need not expect... [T]hose who place themselves in a political arena 
must accept a degree of derogation that others need not." West, 
872 P.2d at 1019-20. 
Adding this caution to the dedication of the Supreme Court to 
protect the purpose of the First Amendment, and adding the 
audience's recognition of the nature of the political arena, it is 
clear that the statements made by the defendant would not have 
injured the plaintiff's reputation in the eyes of the audience. As 
a matter of law, the defendant's statements are not defamatory.2 
2Because the statements cannot meet the requisite threshold 
determination of defamatory meaning, this court will not address 
the defenses raised by the defendant. As well, the Rule 56(f) 
motion does not require comment as the discovery is not required as 
the statement is not defamatory as a matter of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
Dated this' day of August, 1997: 
WILLI 
DISTRIC 
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